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Abstract
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite,
1975) holds that dictatorship is the only Pareto optimal and strategyproof social choice
function on the full domain of preferences. Much of the work in mechanism design aims
at getting around this impossibility theorem. Three grand success stories stand out.
On the domains of single peaked preferences, of house matching, and of quasilinear pref-
erences, there are appealing Pareto optimal and strategyproof social choice functions.
We investigate whether these success stories are robust to strengthening strategyproof-
ness to obvious strategyproofness, recently introduced by Li (2015). A social choice
function is obviously strategyproof (OSP) implementable if even cognitively limited
agents can recognize their strategies as weakly dominant.
For single peaked preferences, we characterize the class of OSP-implementable and
unanimous social choice functions as dictatorships with safeguards against extremism —
mechanisms (which turn out to also be Pareto optimal) in which the dictator can choose
the outcome, but other agents may prevent the dictator from choosing an outcome that
is too extreme. Median voting is consequently not OSP-implementable. Indeed, the
only OSP-implementable quantile rules choose either the minimal or the maximal ideal
point. For house matching, we characterize the class of OSP-implementable and Pareto
optimal matching rules as sequential barter with lurkers — a significant generalization
over bossy variants of bipolar serially dictatorial rules. While Li (2015) shows that
second-price auctions are OSP-implementable when only one good is sold, we show
that this positive result does not extend to the case of multiple goods. Even when
all agents’ preferences over goods are quasilinear and additive, no welfare-maximizing
auction where losers pay nothing is OSP-implementable when more than one good is
sold. Our analysis makes use of a gradual revelation principle, an analog of the (direct)
revelation principle for OSP mechanisms that we present and prove.
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1 Introduction
The concern with incentives sets mechanism design apart from algorithm and protocol de-
sign. A mechanism that directly elicits preferences is strategyproof if no agent ever has any
incentive to misreport her preferences. Strategyproofness may, however, not be enough to
get the participants in a mechanism to report their true preferences. Indeed, the partici-
pants must understand that it is in their best interest to reveal their true preferences — they
must understand that the mechanism is strategyproof. Depending on whether it is more or
less easy to grasp the strategic properties of a mechanism, different extensive forms that
implement the same strategyproof mechanism may yield different results in practice: while
the participants may in some case easily understand that no lie about their preferences can
possibly benefit them, they may not be able to see this in a different extensive form that
implements the same social choice function.
Think of a second-price auction, for example. We can on the one hand solicit sealed
bids, and award the auctioned good to the highest bidder, charging her the second-highest
bid. Alternatively, we may use a clock that continuously increases the price of the good. In
this case, agents choose when to drop out, and once only one last agent remains, this agent
obtains the good and pays the current clock price. Assuming that the bidders’ values are
independent, both mechanisms implement the same — strategyproof — social choice func-
tion: submitting one’s true value in the sealed-bid auction, and equivalently, dropping out of
the ascending clock auction when one’s own value is reached, are weakly dominant strategies
in these two mechanisms. However, it is well documented that agents approach these two
mechanisms differently. It appears (Kagel et al., 1987) that the strategyproofness of the
implementation using an ascending clock is easier to understand than the strategyproofness
of the sealed-bid implementation. Recently, Li (2015) proposed the concept of obvious
strategyproofness, which captures this behavioral difference.
Unlike classic strategyproofness, which is a property of the social choice function in ques-
tion, Li’s obvious strategyproofness is a property of the mechanism implementing this social
choice function. To check whether a strategy is obviously dominant for a given player,
one must consider each of the histories at which this player can get to choose in case she
follows the given strategy. Fixing any such history, the player compares the worst-possible
outcome starting from this history given that she follows this strategy, with the best-possible
outcome from this history given that she deviates at the history under consideration. To
evaluate these best- and worst-possible outcomes, the player considers all possible choices
of all other players in the histories following on the current history. If at each such his-
tory, the worst-possible outcome associated with following the strategy is no worse than
the best-possible outcome associated with a deviation, then the strategy is said to be obvi-
ously dominant. If each player has an obviously dominant strategy, then the mechanism is
obviously strategyproof (OSP), and the social choice function that it implements is OSP-
implementable. OSP-implementability is a stricter condition than strategyproofness. Li
(2015) shows that even cognitively limited agents may recognize an obviously strategyproof
mechanism as strategyproof.
Li (2015) shows that the implementation of second-price auction via an ascending clock
is obviously strategyproof, while the implementation via sealed bids is not. To see this,
consider a bidder with value 4. If she submits a sealed bid of 4, then the worst-case utility
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she may obtain is 0 (if her bid is not the highest). If she instead were to bid 6 — and all
other bidders bid 0 — then she would obtain a utility of 4. So, bidding her true value is
not obviously dominant. In contrast, when the clock in an ascending implementation stands
at 3, this same agent compares the worst utility associated with dropping out with the best
utility associated with staying in. Since both equal 0, staying in is an obviously dominant
choice at this history (as well as at any other history where the clock stands at less than 4).
While Li (2015) makes a strong case that obviously strategyproof mechanisms outperform
mechanisms that are only strategyproof, he leaves open the question of which social choice
functions are OSP-implementable. The current paper examines this question through the
lens of the popular desideratum of Pareto optimality. That is, this paper asks which Pareto
optimal social choice functions are OSP-implementable.
When agents may hold any preference over a set of at least three outcomes, then any
strategyproof and Pareto optimal social choice function is — by the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
Impossibility Theorem (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975) — dictatorial. So, to find Pareto
optimal, OSP-implementable and nondictatorial social choice functions, we must investigate
social choice functions for domains that are not covered by the Gibbard-Satterthwaite the-
orem. We accordingly conduct our analysis in the three most popular domains that provide
“escape routes” from the Gibbard and Satterthwaite impossibility theorem: the domain of
single peaked preferences, the quasilinear domain, and the house matching domain. On
each of these three domains, there are some well-studied strategyproof, Pareto optimal, and
nondictatorial social choice functions.
In each of these three domains, we fully characterize the class of OSP-implementable and
Pareto optimal social choice function (for the quasilinear domain, as is customary, we also
require that losers pay nothing). On the one hand, our findings suggest that obvious strate-
gyproofness is a highly restrictive concept. Indeed, apart from two special cases of “popular”
mechanisms that were already known to be OSP-implementable — the auction of a single
good (Li, 2015), and trade with no more than two traders at any given round (Ashlagi and
Gonczarowski, 2015; Troyan, 2016) — our analysis of all three domains finds only one more
such special case of “popular” mechanisms: choosing the maximum or minimum ideal point
when all agents have single peaked preferences. On the other hand, our complete character-
izations show that outside of these, a few rather exotic and quite intricate mechanisms are
also obviously strategyproof.
The investigation of each of these three domains builds on a revelation principle that
we state and prove for obviously strategyproof mechanisms. This revelation principle shows
that a social choice function is OSP-implementable if and only if it can be implemented by
an obviously incentive compatible gradual revelation mechanism. A mechanism
is a gradual revelation mechanism if each choice of an agent is identified with a partition
of the set of all the agent’s preferences that are consistent with the choices made by the
agent so far. In a truthtelling strategy, the agent gradually reveals her preference: at each
juncture, she chooses a smaller set of preferences that her own preference belongs to. With
her last choice, the agent fully reveals her preference. Furthermore, in a gradual revelation
mechanism, whenever an agent can fully disclose her preference without hurting obvious
strategyproofness, she does so. A gradual revelation mechanism does, moreover, not allow
for simultaneous moves, for directly consecutive choices by the same agent, or for choice sets
with a single action.
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In the domain of single peaked preferences, we find that a mechanism is Pareto optimal
and obviously strategyproof if and only if it is a dictatorship with safeguards against
extremism. In such a mechanism, there is one “dictator” who may freely choose any option
from a central set. If she would rather choose an option to the right or left of that central set,
then she needs to win the approval of some other agents. The set of agents whose approval
is needed for right-wing positions increases as these positions move farther to the right.
The same holds for left-wing positions. Finally, if the electorate has already identified that
one of two adjacent options will be chosen, then a process of arbitration between these two
options may ensue. Dictatorships with safeguards against extremism embed dictatorships:
in the case of a dictatorship, the central set from which the dictator may freely choose is
the grand set of all options. Dictatorships with safeguards against extremism also embed
social choice functions that choose the minimal (and respectively maximal) ideal point of all
agents. However, median voting is not OSP-implementable. To see this, suppose it were, and
consider the first agent to make any decision in an obviously strategyproof mechanism that
implements median voting. For any deviation from the truthful revelation of her ideal policy,
the best case for the agent is that all other agents were to announce her own ideal policy
as theirs, and this policy would get chosen. Conversely, if the agent follows the truthtelling
strategy, then the worst case for the agent is that all other agents declare the policy that
this agent considers worst as their ideal policy.
For the quasilinear domain with multiple goods, we find that any Pareto optimal (or
equivalently, welfare maximizing) mechanism in which losers pay nothing (such as VCG
with the Clarke pivot rule (Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973)) is not obviously
strategyproof. To make our case strongest, we show that this holds even if there are only
two goods and all agents’ utilities are additive. This implies that Li’s 2015 result that a
second-price auction is OSP-implementable does not extend beyond one good. To get some
intuition into the restrictiveness of obvious strategyproofness in the setting of auctions,
consider two sequential ascending auctions: the first for a bottle of wine and the second for
a violin. Assume that apart from a single agent who participates in both auctions, all other
participants participate in only one of the auctions, and furthermore, those who participate
only in the second auction (for the violin) have knowledge of neither the bids nor the outcome
of the wine auction. Assume that the utility of the single agent who participates in both
auctions is additive, so this agent values the bundle consisting of both the bottle and the
violin at the sum of her values for the bottle alone and for the violin alone. We emphasize
that in the wine auction, this agent considers the other agents’ behavior in all later histories,
including the histories of the violin auction. Observe that if this agent values the bottle at 4
then, in contrast with the setting of a single ascending auction, she may not find it obviously
dominant to continue bidding at 3. Indeed, if she drops out at 3 and if all agents behave in
the most favorable way in all later histories, then she gets the violin for free; otherwise, she
may be outbid for the violin. So, if she values the violin at v > 1, then staying in the wine
auction at 3 is not obviously dominant.
For the house matching domain, we find that a mechanism is Pareto optimal and obvi-
ously strategyproof if and only if it can be represented as sequential barter with lurkers.
Sequential barter is a trading mechanism with many rounds. At each such round, there are
at most two owners. Each not-yet-matched house sequentially becomes owned by one of
them. Each of the owners may decide to leave with a house that she owns, or they may both
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agree to swap. If an owner does not get matched in the current round, she owns at least the
same houses in the next round. When a lurker appears, she may ultimately get matched
to any one house in some set S. A lurker is similar to a dictator in the sense that she may
immediately appropriate all but one special house in the set S. If she favors this special
house the most, she may “lurk” it, in which case she is no longer considered an owner (so
there are at most two owners, and additionally any number of lurkers, each for a different
house). If no agent who is entitled to get matched with this special house chooses to do so,
then the lurker obtains it as a residual claimant. Otherwise, the lurker gets the second-best
house in this set S. The definition of sequential barter with lurkers reveals that the various
mechanics that come into play within obviously strategyproof mechanisms are considerably
richer and more diverse than previously demonstrated.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the model and definitions, including
the definition of obvious strategyproofness. Section 3 presents the gradual revelation princi-
ple. Section 4 studies voting with two possible outcomes. Sections 5, 6, and 7 respectively
study single peaked preferences, quasilinear preferences, and house matching. We conclude
in Section 8. Proofs and some auxiliary results are relegated to the appendix.
2 Model and Definitions
2.1 The Design Problem
There is a finite set of agents N := {1, . . . , n} with typical element i ∈ N and a set of
outcomes Y . Agent i’s preference Ri is drawn from a set of possible preference Ri. Each
possible preference Ri is a complete and transitive order on Y , where xPiy denotes the case
that xRiy but not yRix holds. If xRiy and yRix, then x and y are Ri-indifferent. The
domain of all agents’ preferences is R := R1 × · · · × Rn. If two alternatives x and y are
Ri-indifferent for each Ri ∈ Ri, then x and y are completely i-indifferent. The set of all
outcomes that are completely i-indifferent to y is [y]i.
We consider three classes of design problems. In a political problem with single peaked
preferences, we represent the set of social choices as a the set of integers Z. For every i ∈ N
and any Ri ∈ Ri, there exists an ideal point y∗ ∈ Y such that y′ < y ≤ y∗ or y∗ ≥ y > y′
implies yPiy
′ for all y, y′ ∈ Y . In the case of quasilinear preferences, the outcome space
is Y := X ×M , where X is a set of allocations and M is a set of monetary payments with
mi representing the payment charged from agent i. Each agent’s preference is represented
by a utility function Ui(x,m) = ui(x) +mi, where ui is a utility function on X. In a house
matching problem, the outcome space Y is the set of one-to-one matchings between agents
and a set O of at least as many1 houses, constructed as follows. An agent-house pair (i, o) is
a match, and a matching is a set of matches where each agent i ∈ N partakes in precisely one
match, and no house o ∈ O partakes in multiple matches. Each agent only cares about the
house she is matched with. Each agent, moreover, strictly ranks any two different houses.
So any x and y are completely i-indifferent if and only if i is matched to the same house
1We show in the appendix that our results extend to the case where some agents may not be matched to
any house, i.e., the case of matching with outside options. In this case, there is no restriction on the number
of houses.
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under x and under y.
A social choice function scf : R → Y maps each profile of preferences R ∈ R to an
outcome scf (R) ∈ Y .
2.2 Mechanisms
A (deterministic) mechanism is an extensive game form with the set N as the set of players.
The set of histories H of this game form are the set of (finite and infinite2) paths from the
root of the directed game form tree. For a history h = (ak)k=1,... of length at least L, we
denote by h|L = (ak)k=1,...,L ∈ H the subhistory of h of length L ≥ 0. We write h′ ⊆ h
when h′ is a subhistory of h. A history is terminal if it is not a subhistory of any other
history. (So a terminal history is either a path to a leaf or an infinite path.) The set of all
terminal histories is Z.
The set of possible actions after the nonterminal history h is A(h) := {a | (h, a) ∈ H}.
The player function P maps any nonterminal history h ∈ H \ Z to a player P (h) who gets
to choose from all actions A(h) at h. Each terminal history h ∈ Z is mapped to an outcome
in Y .
Each player i has an information partition Ii of the set P−1(i) of all nodes h with
P (h) = i, with A(h) = A(h′) if h and h′ belong to the same cell of Ii. The cell to which h
with P (h) = i belongs is Ii(h).
3 A behavior Bi for player i is an Ii-measurable function
mapping each h with P (h) = i to an action in A(h). A behavior profile B = (Bi)i∈N
lists a behavior for each player. The set of behaviors for player i and the set of behavior
profiles are respectively denoted Bi and B. A behavior profile B induces a unique terminal
history hB = (ak)k=1,... s.t. a
k+1 = BP (hB |k)(h
B|k) for every k s.t. hB|k is nonterminal. The
mechanism M : B → Y maps the behavior profile B ∈ B to the outcome y ∈ Y that is
associated with the terminal history hB. We call the set of all subhistories of the terminal
history hB the path Path(B). A strategy Si for agent i is a function Si : Ri → Bi. The
strategy profile S = (Si)i∈N induces the social choice function scf : R → Y if scf (R)
equals M(S(R)) for each R ∈ R.
In a direct revelation mechanism all agents move simultaneously. Agent i ’s behavior
space consists of his set of possible preferences Ri. A strategy Si for i maps each preference
Ri ∈ Ri to another preference Si(Ri). The truthtelling strategy Ti maps each preference
Ri onto itself.
2.3 Normative Criteria
A social choice function scf is Pareto optimal if it maps any R to an outcome scf (R) that
is Pareto optimal at R. An outcome y ∈ Y in turn is Pareto optimal at R if there exists no
y′ ∈ Y such that y′Riy holds for all i and y′Pi′y holds for at least one i′.
A strategy Si in a mechanism M is dominant if M(Si(Ri), B−i)RiM(B) holds for all
behavior profiles B and all Ri ∈ Ri. So Si is dominant if it prescribes for each possible
2Unlike Li (2015), we allow for infinite histories mainly to allow for easier exposition of our analysis of
the domain of single peaked preferences. See Section 5 for more details.
3Li (2015) also imposes the condition of perfect recall onto information partitions. Our results hold with
and without prefect recall. For ease of exposition, we therefore do not impose prefect recall.
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preference Ri ∈ Ri a behavior Si(Ri) such that i prefers the outcome of M given that
behavior to the outcome of M given any other behavior Bi, no matter which behavior the
other agents follow. A direct revelation mechanism is incentive compatible if truthtelling
is a dominant strategy for each player. The revelation principle states that each social choice
function that can be implemented in dominant strategies can be implemented by an incentive
compatible direct revelation mechanism.
A strategy Si is obviously dominant (Li, 2015) for agent i if for every Ri ∈ Ri,
behavior profiles B and B′, and histories h and h′ with h ∈ Path(Si(Ri), B−i), h′ ∈ Path(B′),
P (h) = P (h′) = i, Ii(h) = Ii(h′), and Si(Ri)(h) 6= B′i(h′) we have
M(Si(Ri), B−i)RiM(B′).
So, the strategy Si has to meet a stricter condition to be considered not just strategyproof
but also obviously strategyproof: at each juncture that is possibly reached during the game,
agent i considers whether to deviate from the action Si(Ri)(h) prescribed by his strategy Si
at that juncture to a different action Bi(h). The condition that Si has to meet is that
even under the worst-case scenario (minimizing over all other agents’ behaviors and over i’s
uncertainty) if agent i follows Si(Ri)(h) at that juncture, and under the best-case scenario
(maximizing over all other agents’ behaviors and over i’s uncertainty) if agent i deviates to
Bi(h) 6= Si(Ri)(h), agent i still prefers not to deviate.
A social choice function scf is implementable in obviously dominant strategies, or OSP-
implementable, if S is a profile of obviously dominant strategies in some mechanism M
and if scf (·) = M(S(·)). In the next section, we show that a modified revelation principle
holds for implementation in obviously dominant strategies.
3 A Revelation Principle for
Extensive-Form Mechanisms
In this section we develop an analogue, for OSP mechanisms, of the celebrated (direct)
revelation principle (for strategyproof mechanisms). Our gradual revelation approach is
conceptually similar to that of direct revelation: we define gradual revelation mechanisms so
that agents gradually reveal more and more about their preferences. We then prove that any
OSP-implementable social choice function is implementable by an OSP gradual revelation
mechanism. We use this gradual revelation principle throughout this paper.
A gradual revelation mechanism is a mechanism with the following additional prop-
erties:4
1. Each cell Ii(h) of each information partition Ii is a singleton.
4While most of the following properties are novel, Ashlagi and Gonczarowski (2015) already showed that
any OSP-implementable social choice function is also implementable by an OSP mechanism with Properties 1
and 4. For completeness, we spell out the proof that Properties 1 and 4 may be assumed without loss of
generality. Pycia and Troyan (2016) independently stated a property weaker than our Property 5, and
showed that it may be assumed without loss of generality (see the discussion in Section 7 that relates that
paper to ours).
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2. No agent has two directly consecutive choices: P (h) 6= P (h, a) holds for every nonter-
minal history (h, a).
3. Choices are real: no A(h) is a singleton.
4. Each finite history h is identified with a nonempty set Ri(h) for each i ∈ N . For
the empty history, Ri(∅) = Ri. For each nonterminal h with P (h) = i, the set
{Ri(h, a) | a ∈ A(h)} partitions Ri(h). If P (h) 6= i, then Ri(h) = Ri(h, a) for all
a ∈ A(h).
5. For every agent i, behavior Bi for agent i, and nonterminal history h with i = P (h),
if the set {M(B) | B−i s.t. h ∈ Path(B)} is a nonempty set of completely i-indifferent
outcomes, then R(h,Bi(h)) is a singleton.
Property 4 requires that each agent with each choice reveals more about the set that
her preference belongs to. Property 5 then requires that whenever the behavior of agent
i starting at h ensures that the outcome lies in some given set of completely i-indifferent
outcomes, then i immediately ensures this with the action chosen at h. Furthermore, i
completely reveals her preference when choosing this action.
A strategy Ti for player i in a gradual revelation mechanism is a truthtelling strategy
if Ri ∈ Ri(h,Ti(Ri)(h)) holds for all nonterminal h with P (h) = i and all Ri ∈ Ri(h).
So Ti is a truthtelling strategy if agent i reveals which set his preference Ri belongs to,
whenever possible. If Ri /∈ Ri(h), then the definition imposes no restriction on the behavior
of agent i = P (h) with preference Ri. Since the specification of Ti(Ri) for histories h
with Ri /∈ Ri(h) is inconsequential to our analysis, we call any truthtelling strategy the
truthtelling strategy. A gradual revelation mechanism is obviously incentive compatible
if the truthtelling strategy Ti is obviously dominant for each agent i. We say that an
obviously incentive compatible gradual revelation mechanism M implements a social choice
function scf : R → Y if scf (·) = M(T(·)).
Theorem 3.1. A social choice function is OSP-implementable if and only if some obviously
incentive compatible gradual revelation mechanism M implements it.
The proof of Theorem 3.1 is relegated to Appendix A.
For any h, we define the set R(h) as the set of all preference profiles R ∈ R with
Ri ∈ Ri(h) for every i. In a gradual revelation mechanism, h is on the path Path(T(R)) if
and only if R ∈ R(h). A gradual revelation mechanism is consequently obviously incentive
compatible if and only if the following holds for each nonterminal history h in M , where we
denote i = P (h):
M(T(R))RiM(T(R
′)) for all R,R′ ∈ R(h) s.t. Ti(Ri)(h) 6= Ti(R′i)(h).
So the agent i who moves at h must prefer the worst-case — over all preference profiles of
other agents such that h is reached — outcome reached by truthtelling, i.e., by following
Ti(Ri), over the best-case — over all preference profiles of other agents such that h is reached
— outcome reached by deviating to any alternative behavior that prescribes a different action
Ti(R
′
i)(h) 6= Ti(Ri)(h) at h.
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For any history h, let Y (h) be the set of all outcomes associated with a terminal history
h′ with h ⊆ h′. In an obviously incentive compatible gradual revelation mechanism M , let h
be a nonterminal history and let i = P (h) . We define Y ∗h ⊆ Y (h) to be the set of outcomes
y such that there exists some a ∈ A(h) s.t. Y (h, a) ⊆ [y]i. We define A∗h ⊆ A(h) to be the
set of actions a such that Y (h, a) ⊆ [y]i for some y ∈ Y ∗h . We call A∗h the set of dictatorial
actions at h. Let A∗h := A(h)\A∗h and Y ∗h := Y (h)\Y ∗h . We call A∗h the set of nondictatorial
actions at h. We will show below that Y ∗h and A
∗
h are nonempty for the single peaked as
well as the matching domain. (See Theorem 4.1 and Lemmas 5.3, 5.5, 5.6, and E.4.) Before
considering these domains, we perform some additional preliminary analysis in Appendix A.
4 Voting
Majority voting is not obviously strategyproof even when there are just two possible out-
comes, i.e., Y := {y, z}. In fact, unanimity (e.g., choosing the outcome z if and only if all
agents prefer it to y) is the only obviously strategyproof supermajority rule. In the sequential
implementation of any other supermajority rule, the first agent P (∅) does not have an action
that determines one of the two choices. So, for whichever choice she picks, the worst-case
scenario is that all other agents vote against her. On the other hand, the best-case scenario
if she picks the other outcome is that all other agents would vote for her preferred outcome.
There are, however, some nondictatorial obviously strategyproof unanimous voting mech-
anisms. In a proto-dictatorship, each agent in a stream of agents is given either the choice
between implementing y or going on, or the choice between implementing z and going on.
The mechanism terminates either when one of these agents chooses to implement the out-
come offered to her, or with a last agent who is given the choice between implementing y or
z. At each nonterminal history h of a proto-dictatorship M , (precisely) one of the following
holds:
• Y ∗h = {y} and A∗h = {a˜} with Y (h, a˜) = {y, z}.
• Y ∗h = {z} and A∗h = {a˜} with Y (h, a˜) = {y, z}, or
• Y ∗h = {y, z} (and A∗h = ∅).
There is moreover no terminal history h such that one agent moves twice on the path to
reach h: P (h′) 6= P (h′′) holds for any h′ ( h′′ ( h.
Theorem 4.1. Let Y = {y, z}. Then M is obviously strategyproof and onto if and only if it
is a proto-dictatorship.
The proof of Theorem 4.1, which readily follows from the analysis of Section 3 (and
Appendix A), is relegated to Appendix B.
5 Single Peaked Preferences
In the domain of single peaked preferences, the possible outcomes (also called policies) are
Y = Z, and each agent (also called voter) has single peaked preferences, i.e., the agent
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prefers some y ∈ Z, called the agent’s ideal point, the most, and for every y′′ > y′ ≥ y or
y′′ < y′ ≤ y, the agent strictly prefers y′ over y′′. A unanimous social choice function is
one that, if the ideal points of all agents coincide, chooses the joint ideal point. Unanimity
is a strictly weaker assumption than Pareto optimality.
With single peaked preferences, there is a large range of strategyproof and unanimous
social choice functions Moulin (1980). Most prominently, median voting, which maps any
profile of preferences to a median of all voters’ ideal points is strategyproof and unanimous
(and even Pareto optimal). However, median voting is not obviously strategyproof when
there are at least 3 voters. To see this, suppose some gradual revelation mechanism did
implement median voting. Say the ideal point of the first agent in this mechanism is y and
truthtelling prescribes for this agent to choose some action a ∈ A(∅). If all other voters
declare their ideal point to be some y′ 6= y, then y′, the median of all declared preferences,
is implemented regardless of the first agent’s choice a. If the first agent deviates to some
action a′ 6= a and if all voters — according to the best-case scenario — say their ideal point
is y, then y as the median of all announced preferences is implemented. In sum, truthtelling
is not obviously strategyproof for the first agent.
A different, less popular, unanimous (and even Pareto optimal) and strategyproof social
choice function for any single peaked domain is the function min, which maps any profile
of preferences to the minimal ideal point. We observe that if the set of possible ideal points
is bounded from below by some bound y, then this function is OSP-implementable: The
obviously strategyproof implementation of min follows along the lines of the (obviously
strategyproof) ascending implementation of second-price auctions. The min mechanism
starts with y. For each number y ∈ [y,∞) ∩ Z, sequentially in increasing order, each agent
is given an option to decide whether to continue or to stop. When one agent stops at some
y, the mechanism terminates with the social choice y.
In this section, we show that the obviously strategyproof and unanimous mechanisms for
the domain of single peaked preferences are combinations of min, max, and dictatorship,
and furthermore, they are all Pareto optimal. We define dictatorship with safeguards
against extremism for domains of single peaked preferences as follows: One agent, say
1, is called the dictator. All other agents have limited veto rights. Specifically, each agent
i 6= 1 can block extreme leftists policies and rightist policies in the rays (−∞, li) and (ri,∞),
for some li ≤ ri ∈ Z ∪ {−∞,∞}. Furthermore, there exists some ym with li ≤ ym ≤ ri for
all i. Say that yi and yi respectively are agent i’s preferred policies in the rays (−∞, li] and
[ri,∞). Then the outcome of the dictatorship with safeguard against extremism is agent 1’s
most preferred policy in
⋂
i 6=1[y
i, yi].
According to this social choice function, agent 1 is free to choose any policy “in the
middle”: If agent 1’s ideal policy y is in [maxi 6=1 li,mini 6=1 ri], then y is implemented. Note
that by assumption, ym ∈ [maxi 6=1 li,mini 6=1 ri], and so this choice set is nonempty. If agent
1’s ideal policy is farther to the left or right, then it may only be chosen if none of a select
group of citizens vetoes this choice. As we consider more extreme policies, the group that
needs to consent to the implementation of a policy increases. Dictatorships with safeguards
against extremism embed standard dictatorships (li = −∞ and ri =∞ for all i). They also
embed min when the ideal points are bounded from below by some y (by ri = y for all i) as
well as max when the ideal points are bounded from above by some y (by li = y for all i).
Fix a dictatorship with safeguards against extremism scf . Then scf is implementable in
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obviously dominant strategies by the mechanism that first offers the dictator to choose any
option in [L∗, H∗] :=
⋂
i 6=1[y
i, yi]. If the dictator does not choose an option in this interval,
then she indicates whether the mechanism is to continue to the left or to the right (according
to the direction of the dictator’s ideal point). If the mechanism continues to the right, then
similarly to the implementation of min, the mechanism starts with H∗, and for each policy
y ∈ [H∗,∞), sequentially in increasing order, each agent i with either i = 1 (the dictator) or
ri ≤ y is given an option to decide whether to continue or to stop at y. When an agent stops
at some y, the mechanism terminates with the social choice y. If the mechanism continues
to the left, then similarly to the implementation of max, the mechanism starts with L∗, and
for each policy y ∈ (−∞, L∗] in decreasing order, the dictator (agent 1) and each agent i
with li ≥ y may decide to stop the mechanism with the implementation of y.
To see that this mechanism is obviously strategyproof, assume that the ideal point of some
agent i is y∗. If this agent is the dictator and y∗ ∈ [L∗, H∗], then choosing y∗ as the outcome
is obviously strategyproof, as the worst-case outcome under this strategy is the best-possible
outcome. We claim that for any agent (whether or not the dictator), continuing to the right
at any y < y∗ and then stopping at y∗ is obviously strategyproof. Indeed, continuing at
any y < y∗ is obviously strategyproof since the worst-case outcome under the strategy that
continues until y∗ and then stops at y∗ is in [y, y∗]∩Z, and therefore no worse than y, which is
the best-possible outcome when deviating to stopping at y. Stopping at y = y∗ is obviously
strategyproof as it implements i’s top choice. By the same argument, continuing to the left
when y > y∗ and then stopping at y∗ is obviously strategyproof.
To see that the mechanism is Pareto optimal, first consider the case where the dictator
chooses a policy y from [L∗, H∗]. In this case, the dictator strictly prefers y to all other
policies and the outcome is Pareto optimal. If the dictator initiates a move to (say) the
right, then the mechanism either stops at the ideal policy of some agent, or it stops at a
policy that is to the left of the dictator’s ideal point and to the right of the ideal point of
the agent who chose to stop. In either case, Pareto optimality is satisfied.5
If we require our social choice function to cover finer and finer grids in R, then only the
above mechanism is OSP-implementable. However, with our fixed grid, namely Y = Z, the
set of obviously strategyproof and unanimous mechanisms is slightly larger than the set of
dictatorships with safeguards against extremism as defined above. We may then combine
dictatorships with safeguards against extremism with the proto-dictatorships of Theorem
4.1. When such a mechanism moves to the right or left, some agents may in addition to
stopping or continuing at y call for “arbitration” between y and a directly neighboring option.
More specifically, if, e.g., the mechanism goes right from y′ to y′+1, some specific agent with
ri = y
′+1 may not only force the outcome to be y′+1, but may also (alternatively) choose
to initiate an “arbitration” between y′ and y′+1 via a proto-dictatorship (whose parameters
depend on y′+1).6 In such a case, the obviously strategyproof implementation allows i the
5On a side note, if we only demanded for any agent with ideal point y ∈ Z, that for every y′′ > y′ ≥ y
or y′′ < y′ ≤ y, this agent weakly (rather than strictly) prefers y′ over y′′, then after someone says “stop”
at some value y, to ensure Pareto optimality, the mechanism would start going in the other direction until
some agent (who was allowed to say stop w.r.t. y) says stop again, which such a player does not do as long
as she is indifferent between the current value and the one that will follow it.
6Similarly, if the set of ideal points is bounded from (say) above by some y, then one specific agent with
ri = y may choose arbitration between y−1 and y.
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choice between forcing y′+1, initiating an arbitration, and continuing, immediately after all
relevant players were given the option to stop at y′ and before any other player is given the
option to stop at y′+1.
In an upcoming working paper that was prepared without knowledge of the current
paper, Arribillaga et al. (2016) also study OSP-implementable social choice functions on the
domain of single peaked preferences, but focus on which coalition can be formed. Recast
into the language of our paper, their results show that the possibility of arbitration (which
we consider to be a side effect of discretization) can be used to construct coalition systems,
and characterize these possible systems. Take, for example, a dictatorship with safeguards
against extremism with r2 = 5, so if the dictator wishes to go right at 4, then agent 2
can decide to stop at 5 but not at 4. Assume, now, that at 5 agent 2 can also choose to
initiate an arbitration between 4 and 5. Assume, furthermore, that the proto-dictatorship
implementing this arbitration is simply a choice by agent 3 between the outcomes 4 and 5.
The resulting mechanism is such that agent 2 can stop unilaterally at 5, but can force the
mechanism stop at 4 only when joining forces with agent 3 (indeed, for the outcome 4 to
be implemented, agent 2 must initiate the arbitration, and agent 3 must choose 4 in the
arbitration), so the coalition of both of these agents is needed to stop at 4.
Theorem 5.1. If Y = Z, a social choice function scf for the domain of single peaked
preferences is unanimous and OSP-implementable if and only if it is a dictatorship with
safeguards against extremism (with the possibility of arbitration as defined above). Any such
scf is moreover Pareto optimal.
The proof of Theorem 5.1 follows from Lemmas 5.2 through 5.6 that are given below,
and from Theorem 4.1. The proof of these lemmas, along with the statement and proof of
the supporting Lemmas C.1 through C.3, is relegated to Appendix C.
Lemma 5.2. Any dictatorship with safeguards against extremism is Pareto optimal (and in
particular unanimous) and OSP-implementable.
The remaining Lemmas 5.3 through 5.6 apply to any obviously incentive compatible grad-
ual revelation mechanism M for single peaked preferences, under an additional assumption
that can be made without loss of generality; see the paragraph opening Appendix C for the
full details.
Lemma 5.3. The set Y ∗∅ is nonempty. There exist numbers L
∗ ∈ {−∞} ∪ Z and H∗ ∈
Z ∪ {∞} s.t. L∗ ≤ H∗ and Y ∗∅ = [L∗, H∗] ∩ Z
Lemma 5.4. Assume without loss of generality that P (∅) = 1. Following are all the actions
in A∗∅.
1. If H∗ <∞, then A∗∅ contains an action r with R1(r) = {R1 : ideal point of R1 > H∗}
and Y (r) = [H∗,∞) ∩ Z.
2. If −∞ < L∗, then A∗∅ contains an action l with R1(l) = {R1 : ideal point of R1 < L∗}
and Y (l) = (−∞, L∗] ∩ Z.
12
Lemma 5.5. Let h′ and h = (h′, a′) be two consecutive histories of M . Assume that F :=
maxY ∗h′ ∈ Z and that Rk(h) contains (not necessarily exclusively) all preferences with peak
> F , for every k ∈ N . If Y (h) = [F,∞) ∩ Z, then (precisely) one of the following holds:
1. Y ∗h = {F} and A∗h = {r} with Y (h, r) = [F,∞) ∩ Z,
2. Y ∗h = {F, F + 1} and A∗h = {r} with Y (h, r) = [F + 1,∞) ∩ Z, or
3. Y ∗h = {F +1} and A∗h = {a, r} with Y (h, a) = {F, F +1} and Y (h, r) = [F +1,∞)∩Z.
The “mirror version” of Lemma 5.5) holds for the left:
Lemma 5.6. Let h′ and h = (h′, a′) be two consecutive histories of M . Assume that F :=
minY ∗h′ ∈ Z and that Rk(h) contains (not necessarily exclusively) all preferences with peak
< F , for every k ∈ N . If Y (h) = (−∞, F ] ∩ Z, then (precisely) one of the following holds:
1. Y ∗h = {F} and A∗h = {l} with Y (h, l) = (−∞, F ] ∩ Z,
2. Y ∗h = {F, F − 1} and A∗h = {l} with Y (h, l) = (−∞, F − 1] ∩ Z, or
3. Y ∗h = {F−1} and A∗h = {a, l} with Y (h, a) = {F, F−1} and Y (h, l) = (−∞, F−1]∩Z,
The characterization follows from Lemmas 5.3 through 5.6: By Lemma 5.4, if the dictator
is not happy with any option he can force, then he chooses l (left) or r (right), according
to where his ideal point lies. Assume w.l.o.g. that he chooses to go right. Then initialize
F = H∗, and by Lemma 5.5 (if he chooses to go left, then Lemma 5.6 is used), some other
player is given one of the following three choice sets.
1. Action 1: Force F , Action 2: continue, where F (and everything higher) is still “on
the table”.
2. Action 1: Force F , Action 2: force F+1, Action 3: continue, where only F+1 (and
everything higher) is on the table.
(So in this case, this agent is the last to be able to stop at F and the first to be able
to stop at F+1.)
3. Action 1: Force F + 1, Action 2: restrict to F, F + 1 (“arbitrate,” from here must
start an onto OSP mechanism that chooses between these two options, i.e., a proto-
dictatorship), Action 3: continue, where only F+1 (and everything higher) is on the
table.
If this agent chooses continue while keeping F on the table, then some other agent is given
one of these three choice sets. If, alternatively, this agent chooses to continue with only F+1
(or higher) on the table, then F is incremented by one and some other agent is given the
one of these three choice sets with the “new” F .
For any F ≥ H∗, let DF be the set of players that were given the option to force F
as outcome. (DH∗ includes the dictator by definition.) We claim that DF is nondecreasing
in F . Indeed, for any player who was given the option to force the outcome to be F but not
to force the outcome to be F+1, we have a contradiction w.r.t. the preferences that prefer
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F+1 the most and F second, as by unanimity she cannot force F , but therefore she may
end up with F+2 or higher. Finally, note that for any given F , only one player can choose
to arbitrate between F and F +1, and since that player can force F +1 at that point, by
strategyproofness it follows that she was not given the option to force F before that, and so
the history at which he was allowed to choose “arbitrate” was the first history at which he
was given any choice.
6 Combinatorial Auctions
In a combinatorial auction, there are m > 0 goods and n > 1 agents, called bidders. In such
a setting, an outcome is the allocation of each good to some bidder along with a specification
of how much to charge each bidder. Each bidder has a nonnegative integer valuation for each
bundle of goods, and bidder preferences are represented by utilities that are quasilinear in
money: the utility of each bidder from an outcome is her valuation of the subset of the goods
that is awarded to her, minus the payment she is charged. We assume that the possible set
of valuations contains (at least) all additive ones: where a bidder simply values a bundle of
goods at the sum of her valuations for the separate goods in the bundle. In this setting,
it is customary to define Pareto optimality with respect to the set containing not only all
bidders, but also the auctioneer who receives the revenue from the auction. (Otherwise no
Pareto optimal outcome exists, as the auctioneer can always pay more and more money to
each bidder.) Under this definition, and assuming that goods are worthless to the auctioneer
if unsold, Pareto optimality is equivalent to welfare maximization: each good is awarded to
a bidder who values it most. Furthermore, when considering combinatorial auctions, it is
customary to also require that losers pay nothing.
Li (2015) shows that if m = 1, then an ascending-price implementation of a second-price
auction (which is Pareto optimal and charges losers nothing) is obviously strategyproof. We
will now show that this is as far as these properties can be stretched in combinatorial auctions,
i.e., that for m > 1, no social choice function satisfies these properties. In particular, even
when all valuations are additive, VCG with the Clarke pivot rule (Vickrey, 1961; Clarke,
1971; Groves, 1973) is not OSP-implementable. (Due to discreteness of the valuation space,
there are other Pareto optimal and incentive compatible social choice functions that charge
losers nothing beside VCG with the Clarke pivot rule.7)
Theorem 6.1. For m ≥ 2 goods, no Pareto optimal (or equivalently, welfare maximizing)
social choice function that charges losers nothing is OSP-implementable.
It is enough to prove Theorem 6.1 for m = 2 goods and n = 2 bidders, as this is a special
case of any case with more goods and/or more bidders. The proof is by contradiction: we
restrict (prune, in the language of Li (2015)) the preference domain to consist of precisely
three specifically crafted types t1, t2, t3, each corresponding to an additive valuation. We show
that even after this restriction, whichever agent who moves first has no obviously dominant
strategy. (Regardless of whether VCG or some other social choice function satisfying the
7E.g., modifying VCG with the Clarke pivot rule so that any winner who pays a positive amount gets
a discount of half a dollar, does not hurt Pareto optimality or strategyproofness (and still charges losers
nothing) if all valuations are restricted to be integers.
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above properties is implemented.) Say that agent 1 moves first. Since she has more than
one possible action, then one of her actions, say a, is chosen by only one of her types ti (i.e.,
the other two types do not choose a). If agent 1 of type ti chooses a, then she obtains small
(or zero) utility under the worst-case scenario of the other agent turning out to be of the
same type. It is then key to craft the three possible types such that for each type ti (where
i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) there is a deviation tj with j 6= i such that agent 1 of type ti obtains rather high
utility pretending to be tj when the other agent declares herself to be of the best-case type
tk for which ti’s utility is maximized. This proof contains elements not found in previous
pruning proofs (Li, 2015; Ashlagi and Gonczarowski, 2015), both due to it ruling out a range
of social choice functions rather than a single one (therefore working with bounds on, rather
than precise quantification of, the utility and payment for every preference profile), and since
while all previous such proofs restrict to a domain of preferences of size 2, this proof restricts
to a domain of preferences of size 3, which requires a qualitatively more elaborate argument.
The full details of the proof are relegated to Appendix D.
7 House Matching
In a house matching problem, the set of outcomes Y consists of all one-to-one perfect match-
ings between agents in N and houses in a given set O with |O| ≥ |N |.8 Each agent only cares
about the house she is matched with. In this section, we show that a Pareto optimal social
choice function for this domain is OSP-implementable if and only if it is implementable via
sequential barter with lurkers.
To make our definition of sequential barter with lurkers more accessible, while at the
same time facilitating the comparison with other results on the OSP-implementability of
matching mechanisms, we first define sequential barter — without lurkers. Sequential
barter establishes matchings in trading rounds. In each such round, each agent points to
her preferred house. Differently from the trading cycles mechanisms in the literature, houses
point to agents gradually. As long as no agent is matched, the mechanism chooses an
increasing set of houses and has them point to agents. These choices may be based on the
preferences of already-matched agents. At any round, at most two agents are pointed at.
Once a cycle forms, the agents and houses in that cycle are matched. Consequently, all
houses that pointed to agents matched in this step reenter the process.
With an eye toward the definition of sequential barter with lurkers, it is instructive to
also consider the following equivalent description of sequential barter (without lurkers). A
mechanism is a sequential barter mechanism if and only if it is equivalent to a mechanism
of the following form:
Sequential Barter
1. Notation: The sets O and T respectively track the set of all unmatched houses and
the set of all active traders.9 For each active trader i, the set Di ⊆ O tracks the set of
houses that i was endowed with (i.e., offered to choose from).
8The assumptions of a perfect matching (i.e., that all agents must be matched) and of |O| ≥ |N | are for
ease of presentation. See Appendix E.1 for a discussion on how our analysis extends if this is not the case.
9An invariant of the mechanism is that |T | ≤ 2.
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2. Initialization: O is initialized to be the set of all houses; T ← ∅.
So, at the outset all houses are unmatched, and there are no active traders.
3. Mechanism progress: as long as there are unmatched agents, perform an endowment
step.
• Endowment step:
(a) Choose10 an unmatched agent i, where i must be in T if |T | = 2.
(b) If i /∈ T , then initialize Di ← ∅ and update T ← T ∪ {i}.
(c) Choose some ∅ 6= H ⊆ O \Di.
(d) Update Di ← Di ∪H and perform a question step for i.
• Question step for an agent i ∈ T :
(a) Ask i whether the house she prefers most among O is in Di. If so, then ask i
which house that is, and perform a matching step for i and that house.
(If not, then the current mechanism round ends, and a new endowment
step is initiated.)
• Matching step for an agent i ∈ T and a house o:
(a) Match i and o.
(b) Update T ← T \ {i} and O ← O \ {o}.
(c) i discloses her full preferences to the mechanism.
(d) If T 6= ∅, then for the unique agent j ∈ T :
i. If o ∈ Dj, then set Dj ← O.
ii. Perform a question step for j.
(If T = ∅, then the current mechanism round ends, and a new endowment
step is initiated unless there are no more unmatched agents.)
All previously known OSP-implementable and Pareto optimal mechanisms for house
matching are special cases of sequential barter. Li (2015) already shows that the popu-
lar (and Pareto optimal) top trading cycles (TTC) mechanism (Shapley and Scarf, 1974)
is not obviously strategyproof, yet that serial dictatorship is. Ashlagi and Gonczarowski
(2015) is the first paper to follow-up on Li (2015) and apply obvious strategyproofness.
Studying marriage problems, they show that no stable matching mechanism is obviously
strategyproof for either the men or the women. Due to the overlap between unilateral and
bilateral matching theory, the analysis of Ashlagi and Gonczarowski also applies to the house
matching domain studied here. They in particular show that the following generalizations
of bipolar serially dictatorial rules (Bogomolnaia et al., 2005) can be OSP-implemented: At
each mechanism step, either choose an agent and give her free choice among all unmatched
houses, or choose two agents, partition all unmatched houses into two sets, and each of the
agents gets priority in one of the sets, i.e., gets free pick from that set. If any agent chooses
from her set, then the other gets to pick from all remaining houses. If both agents did not
choose from their sets, then each gets her favorite choice (which is in the set of the other).
10All choices in the mechanism may depend on all preferences already revealed.
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Troyan (2016) generalizes even further by showing that any top trading cycles mechanism
Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1999) where at any given point in time no more than two
agents are pointed to, is OSP-implementable. Troyan (2016) also shows that no other TTC
mechanism is OSP-implementable.
We now relate our work to Pycia (2016), which came out several months before our paper,
and to Pycia and Troyan (2016), which subsumed Pycia (2016) and came out a couple of days
before our paper. Pycia (2016) considers a condition somewhat stronger than OSP, called
strong OSP.11 Pycia (2016) characterizes the sets of matching mechanisms that respectively
are strong-OSP implementable and strong-OSP implementable as well as Pareto optimal as
bossy variants of serial dictatorship. Pycia (2016) uses this result to show that random serial
dictatorship is the unique symmetric and efficient rule satisfying strong OSP. The results
added in Pycia and Troyan (2016) consider OSP (rather than strong OSP) mechanisms
on sufficiently rich preference domains without transfers.12 The first version of that paper
claimed that any efficient OSP mechanism under their conditions is equivalent to what we
call sequential barter (without lurkers). This result was used to characterize random serial
dictatorship as the unique symmetric and efficient OSP mechanism under their conditions.
Responding to our Theorem 7.2, which in particular identifies efficient OSP mechanisms that
cannot be represented as sequential barter, Pycia and Troyan’s subsequent versions replace
their original claim with a correct, nonconstructive characterization of OSP mechanisms
under their conditions. Their proof runs along lines roughly similar to a combination of part
of our Theorem 3.1 (see Footnote 4) and of our Lemma E.4 (this machinery already existed
in the first version of Pycia and Troyan (2016)). Their correct, updated result implies our
Theorem 4.1 on majority voting and indeed recent versions of their paper explicitly state an
equivalent result. Their characterization of random serial dictatorship holds via this updated
result.
To see that some Pareto optimal and OSP mechanisms cannot be represented as sequen-
tial barter, consider the mechanism represented Fig. 1, where three traders are active at
some history. The (bossy) mechanism in Fig. 1 starts by offering agent 1 to claim any house
among a, b, and c. The crux of this mechanism is in that if agent 1 chooses not to claim any
of these houses, then the mechanism can deduce that agent 1 prefers house d the most, and
so at this point a match between agent 2 and house d can be ruled out without violating
Pareto optimality. Even though agent 2 moves before agent 3, the competition over house d
is now only between agents 1 and 3. This allows the three agents 1, 2, and 3 to be active at
the same time. We note that this mechanism had to be crafted in quite a delicate manner
to maintain obvious strategyproofness beyond this point: if agent 3 chooses d, then agent
1 must — to maintain strategyproofness — once again be offered to choose between a, b,
and c; conversely, if agent 3 chooses a different house, then since this house may be agent
1’s second-most preferred house, to maintain strategyproofness in this case agent 1 must be
matched with house d.
So, if a mechanism deduces that some agent prefers some house the most (the only way
11Strong OSP was implicitly assumed in Pycia (2016); this assumption was made explicit in Pycia and
Troyan (2016).
12Their richness condition holds for house matching. However, it does not hold for single peaked preferences
with more than two possible outcomes (the setting of Section 5), and the assumption of no transfers does
not hold for combinatorial auctions (the setting of Section 6).
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Start: Agent 1 is asked for her favorite house
1← a,
the serial dictatorship:
2, then 3, then 4
a
1← b,
the serial dictatorship:
2, then 3, then 4
b
1← c,
the serial dictatorship:
2, then 3, then 4
c
Agent 2 is asked for
her favorite house
among {a, b, c}
2← a, 1← d, then
serial dictatorship:
4, then 3
a
2← b, 1← d, then
serial dictatorship:
3, then 4
b
Serial dictatorship:
3, then 1,
then 2, then 4
c
d
Figure 1: An OSP and Pareto optimal mechanism for four agents 1, 2, 3, 4 and four houses
a, b, c, d, with three active agents when agent 3 chooses at the bottom-right.
to deduce this without violating OSP and without offering this house to this agent is to
offer all other possible houses to this agent; in this case, we say that this agent is a lurker
for that house), then the mechanism may decide not to allow some other agents to ever
get this house, and this allows the introduction of additional traders (beyond two traders)
under certain delicate constraints. We are now ready to present our characterization of
OSP-implementable and Pareto optimal social choice functions. A mechanism of sequential
barter with lurkers is of the following form:
Sequential Barter with Lurkers
1. Notation: The sets O, T , L, and G respectively track the set of all unmatched houses,
the set of all active traders, the set of all lurkers (i.e., all active traders who lurk
houses), and the set of all houses who don’t have lurkers. For each active trader i,
the sets Di and Oi respectively track the set of houses that i was endowed with (i.e.,
offered to choose from), and the set of houses that i may possibly be matched to.
2. Initialization: O is initialized to be the set of all houses; T ← ∅, L ← ∅, and G ← O.
So, at the outset all houses are unmatched, there are no active traders (including
lurkers), and no house has a lurker.
3. Mechanism progress: as long as there are unmatched agents, perform an endowment
step.
• Endowment step:
(a) Choose13 an unmatched agent i, where i must be in T if |T \ L| = 2.
(b) If i /∈ T , then:
i. Initialize Di ← ∅.
ii. If T \ L = {j} for some agent j and Oj 6= G, then initialize Oi ← G;
otherwise, initialize either Oi ← G or Oi ← O.
13All choices in the mechanism may depend on all preferences already revealed.
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iii. Update T ← T ∪ {i}.
(c) Choose some ∅ 6= H ⊆ Oi \Di such that:14
– If H \G 6= ∅, then H = Oi \Di.
– If Ot 6= G for {t} = T \ (L ∪ {i}), then H ∩Dt = ∅.
(d) Update Di ← Di ∪H and perform a question step for i.
• Question step for an agent i ∈ T :
(a) Ask i whether the house she prefers most among Oi is in Di. If so, then ask i
which house that is, and perform a matching step for i and that house. If
not, and if i /∈ L, then perform a sorting step for i.
• Matching step for an agent i ∈ T and a house o:
(a) Match i and o.
(b) Update T ← T \ {i} and O ← O \ {o}, and Oj ← Oj \ {o} for every j ∈ T .
(c) If i ∈ L, then update L← L \ {i}.
(d) If o ∈ G, then update G← G \ {o}.
(e) i discloses her full preferences to the mechanism.
(f) For every agent j ∈ T :15
i. If o ∈ Dj, then set Dj ← Oj.
ii. Perform a question step for j.
(After all question steps triggered by the present matching step are re-
solved, the current mechanism round ends, and a new endowment step is
initiated unless there are no more unmatched agents.)
• Sorting step for an agent i ∈ T \ L:
(a) If |L \ T | = 2, then let j be the unique agent j ∈ T \ (L ∪ {i}) .
(b) If Oi = G and Oi \Di = {o} for some house o that does not satisfy o ∈ Dj,
then i becomes a lurker for o:
i. Update L← L ∪ {i} and G← G \ {o}.
ii. Choose to either keep Oj as is or to update Oj ← Oj \ {o}, so that after
updating Dj ⊆ Oj holds, and in addition either Oj = O or Oj = G holds.
iii. If Oj was updated, then perform a question step for j.
(If not, then the current mechanism round ends, and a new endowment
step is initiated unless there are no more unmatched agents.)
Remark 7.1. The above mechanism obeys a few invariant properties. Di is for each active
agent i a subset of Oi. For any lurker i ∈ L, the set Oi \Di contains exactly one house —
the house lurked by i, which is preferred by i over every house in Di. At most two active
agents are not lurkers at any given time, i.e., |T \L| ≤ 2. There are no lurkers (i.e., L = ∅)
14We constrain the mechanism so that it may only choose an agent i in an endowment step if there is a
nonempty set of houses H with which the agent can be endowed (i.e., satisfying these constraints) at that
step.
15The outcome of the mechanism does not depend on the order of traversal of T . This insight is what
ensures that the mechanism is OSP. See a discussion below.
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if and only if no unmatched house has a lurker (i.e., G = O). For every i ∈ T \ L, either
Oi = G or Oi = O, and if these options differ (i.e., if L 6= ∅), then the latter is possible for
at most one agent i ∈ T \ L.
The sorting step for agent i determines whether i is a lurker — and should therefore be
added to the set L of lurkers. This is checked whenever the mechanism infers new information
regarding i’s preferences, i.e., after each question step for i. Two different types of events,
in turn, trigger a question step for i: an enlargement of the set Di and a reduction of the
set Oi. The former happens whenever i is offered new houses, i.e., at the conclusion of an
endowment step. The latter can happen either due to a house in Oi being matched to another
agent, i.e., in a matching step, or due to a house in Oi becoming lurked if Oi is set to (the
new) G, i.e., in a sorting step.
Given the introduction of lurkers that precedes the description of the mechanism, the
restrictions on the choice of H in the endowment step, and the restrictions on the sets
Oi for nonlurkers in the endowment and sorting steps, may seem puzzling. (Essentially,
each of these sets Oi is, at each step, either G or O, with the former holding for at least
one nonlurker.) But, as we will now explain, these restrictions are exactly what drives the
obvious incentive compatibility of the mechanism. Ashlagi and Gonczarowski (2015) have
already used in their examples that asking an agent whether she most prefers some given
house, and if the agent’s answer is “yes” then assigning to her that house (and otherwise
continuing), is OSP if the agent is assured she will eventually get “at least” that house. The
matching step makes precisely this assurance when allowing each agent j to be able to claim
their top choice from Dj after Oj is reduced, and to claim any house from Oj if a house from
Dj becomes matched to another agent. Therefore, to verify the obvious strategyproofness
of the mechanism, what has to be checked is that these assurances, made to several agents
in parallel in the matching step, can be simultaneously fulfilled for all these agents. In other
words, we have to check that the corresponding loop over agents in the matching step does
not depend on the order of traversal of T (see Footnote 15).
As it turns out, the above-mentioned “puzzling” restrictions on H and on Oi guarantee
this “simultaneous fulfillment.” To see this, envision a scenario with two active nonlurkers
{i, t} = T \ L, where Oi = G and Ot ∈ {O,G}, and with λ lurkers L = {1, . . . , λ}, such
that agent 1 became lurker first and lurks house o1, agent 2 became lurker after that and
lurks house o2, etc. Note that therefore, O1 = O, O2 = O \ {o1}, O3 = O \ {o1, o2}, etc.
Assume now that one of these agents i, t, 1, . . . , λ chooses a house o in the question step that
immediately follows an endowment step.
If the agent that chooses o is i, then o ∈ Oi = G, and so, since o ∈ Dl for each lurker
l, we have that each lurker l gets free choice from Ol, and so each lurker l chooses ol, and
there is no conflict (so far) in the choices. If Ot = G, then whichever house t prefers most
out of Ot (or out of Dt) after the removal of o from that set has not been claimed by any
lurker, and there can be no conflict between a choice by t and previous choices. On the
other hand, if Ot = O, then by the first “puzzling” restriction on H, we have that Dt ⊆ G
(indeed, if a house not from G were added at any time to Dt by an endowment step, then
by that restriction all houses in Ot were added to Dt and t must have chosen a house in
the immediately following question step), and by the second “puzzling” restriction on H, we
have that o /∈ Dt. Therefore, no house from Dt was claimed by any other agent, and so t is
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given free choice not from Ot but only from Dt (due to reduction in Ot) and there can be no
conflict between a choice by t and previous choices.
Now consider the case in which the agent that chooses o is t, and that o ∈ O\G (if o ∈ G,
then the previous analysis still holds). So o = ol for some lurker l. In this case, similarly to
the previous analysis, each lurker l′ < l has ol ∈ Dl′ and therefore gets free choice from Ol′
and chooses ol′ . So far, all matched houses are o1, . . . , ol, so among them only ol is in Ol,
and none of them are in Dl. So, ol gets free choice from Dl and there is no conflict (so far) in
the choices. If the choice of l is another lurked house ol′ (note that l
′ > l), then we reiterate:
all lurkers older than l′ get their lurked house, and l′ gets free choice from Dl′ , etc. This
continues until some lurker chooses a house in G. Now, as in the previous case (of i choosing
o ∈ G), each remaining lurker gets matched to her lurked house with no conflicts. It remains
to verify that if i makes a choice, then it does not conflict with any of the choices described
so far. This is done precisely as in the case Ot = G of the previous case (of i choosing o): so
far, only one matched house was not a lurked house, so only one house was removed from
Oi; therefore, even if i gets free choice from all remaining houses in Oi, there would be no
conflict.
Finally, if the agent that chooses o is a lurker l,16 then by a similar argument, all lurkers
l′ < l get matched to their lurked house. Then, t gets to choose, but recall that since only
lurked house were matched so far and since Dt ⊆ G (by the first “puzzling” restriction on H),
then t chooses from Dt, so no conflict arises. If t makes a choice, then the remainder of the
analysis is the same as the first case (of i choosing o ∈ G).
So, sequential barter with lurkers is OSP-implementable. Pareto optimality follows from
the fact that whenever a set of houses leaves the game, then one of them (the first in the order
surveyed in the corresponding explanation in the above three paragraphs) is most-preferred
by its matched agent among all not-previously-matched houses, another (the second in the
same order) is most-preferred by its matched agent among all not-previously-matched houses
except for the first, etc.
Theorem 7.2. A Pareto-optimal social choice function in a house matching problem is
OSP-implementable if and only if it is implementable via sequential barter with lurkers.
The proof of Theorem 7.2 along with the statement and proof of the supporting Lemmas
E.1 through E.20, is relegated to Appendix E. The adaptation of the proof to the case of
matching with outside options, i.e., where agents may prefer being unmatched over being
matched to certain houses (and possibly more agents exist than houses) is described in
Appendix E.1.
8 Conclusion
This paper characterizes the set of OSP-implementable and Pareto optimal social choice
functions in the three most popular domains that allow for strategyproof and Pareto optimal
social choice functions that are nondictatorial. We show that obvious strategyproofness rules
16We remark that in the analysis below, l in this case is not called a lurker but a dictator. We omit this
distinction from the mechanism presentation, as it is not needed for complete and correct presentation of
the mechanism, and would only add clutter to it.
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out many of the most popular mechanisms in these domains, but also gives rise to reasonable
mechanisms in some domains, and even to rather exotic and quite intricate mechanisms in
other domains.
For single peaked preferences, while median is not obviously strategyproof, some inter-
esting mechanisms are. Dictatorships with safeguards against extremism indeed seem to be
reasonable mechanisms: in some policy problems, we may generally delegate decision mak-
ing to a “dictator,” and only if this dictator wishes to adopt some extreme position, should
there be some checks in place. It also seems that such mechanism would be no harder to
participate in than ascending auctions. For quasilinear preferences, even when all bidders
have additive preferences, we complement the elegant positive result of Li (2015) regarding
ascending auctions, with a strong impossibility result. To put the restrictiveness of strate-
gyproofness in the setting of auctions into relief, consider two sequential ascending auctions,
where only one bidder takes part in both and where the other bidders in the second auction
know neither the bids nor the outcome of the first. Even when the preferences of the bidder
who takes part in both auctions are additive, bidding her true values for the two goods is not
obviously dominant. However, it seems hard to justify that the strategyproofness of such
sequential ascending auctions, possibly held months apart, should be any less “obvious” (in
the colloquial sense of the word) to such an additive bidder than the strategyproofness of
a single ascending auction. Finally, for house matching, the mechanisms that we identify
are quite complex, and reasoning about them (in fact, even presenting them) seems far from
a natural meaning of “obvious.” Indeed, while in other known OSP mechanisms, a short
argument for the obvious dominance of truthtelling in any history can be written down,
in sequential barter with lurkers, not only can the argument for one history be complicated
and involve nontrivial bookkeeping, but it can also significantly differ from the (complicated)
argument for a different history.
An integrated examination, of all of these negative and positive results, indicates that
obvious strategyproofness may not precisely capture the intuitive idea of “strategyproofness
that is easy to see.” Indeed, for quasilinear preferences it overshoots in a sense, suggesting
that the boundaries of obvious strategyproofness are significantly less far-reaching than one
may hope. Conversely, in the context of house matching this definition undershoots in a
sense, as it gives rise to some mechanisms that one would not naturally describe as “easy to
understand.” In this context, we see various mechanics that come into play within obviously
strategyproof mechanisms that are considerably richer and more diverse than previously
demonstrated.
An interesting question for future research could be to search for an alternative (or
slightly modified) concept of easy-to-understand-strategyproofness. One could, for example,
consider the similarity, across different histories, of a short argument for the dominance
of truthtelling. A mechanism would then be considered easy to understand if a small set
of simple arguments can be used to establish that truthelling is dominant at any possible
history. Perhaps such a definition could encompass sequential ascending auctions for additive
bidders, while precluding the general form of sequential barter with lurkers?
Regardless of whether OSP catches on or some alternative definition emerges, the funda-
mental contribution of Li (2015) in moving the discussion of “strategyproofness that is easy
to see” into the territory of formal definitions and precise analysis will surely linger on.
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A Proof of Theorem 3.1 and Preliminary Analysis
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Fix any mechanism M : S → Y , social choice function scf : R → Y
and obviously strategyproof strategy profile S : R → S. Define a new mechanism M1 : S1 →
Y that is identical to M except that all information sets are singletons. In M , a strategy for
agent i is an Ii-measurable function mapping a nonterminal history h ∈ P−1(i) of player i to
the actions A(h) available at h. In M1, a strategy for agent i has the same definition, only
without the requirement of being Ii-measurable. So, we have S ⊆ S1. Since S is obviously
strategyproof in M , we obtain that S is also obviously strategyproof in M1.17
For every history h in M1 and i, set Ri(h) = {Ri ∈ Ri | ∃B−i : h ∈ Path(Si(Ri), B−i)}.
If P (h) = i, then we note that {Ri(h, a) | a ∈ A(h)} partitions Ri(h), however some
of the sets in this partition may be empty. Since S is obviously strategyproof in M1,
T is obviously strategyproof in M1 as well (w.r.t. the maps just defined). Furthermore,
M1(T(·)) = M1(S(·)) = scf (·).
In the following steps of the proof, we describe modifications to the game tree of the
mechanism. For ease of presentation, we consider the maps P (·), Si(Ri)(·) and Ri(·) to be
defined over nodes of the tree (rather than histories, as we may modify the paths to these
nodes).
Let M20 = M
1. For every agent i ∈ N (inductively on i), we define a new mechanism
M2i : S2i → Y as follows: For every preference Ri, for every minimal history h s.t. P (h) = i
and {M2i−1(T(R)) | h ∈ Path(T(R))} is a nonempty set of completely i-indifferent outcomes,
let a = Ti(Ri)(h), remove Ri from the setRi(h, a), and putRi(h, a′) = {Ri} for a new action
a′ at h that leads to a subtree that is a duplicate of that to which a leads before this change
(with all maps from the nodes of the duplicate subtree defined as on the original subtree).
Note that M2i (T(R)) = M
2
i−1(T(R)) holds for all R, so we have M
2
i (T(·)) = M2i−1(T(·)) =
scf (·). Moreover, since T is obviously strategyproof in M2i−1, T is obviously strategyproof
in M2i . Set M
2 = M2n.
Define a new mechanism M3 : S3 → Y by dropping from M2 any action a for which
there exists no R such that a is on the path Path(T(R)) in M2. Since T is obviously
strategyproof in M2, T is also obviously strategyproof in M3. Furthermore, M3(T(·)) =
M2(T(·)) = scf (·).
Define a new mechanism M4 : S4 → Y as follows. Identify a maximal set of histories H∗
in M3 that satisfies all of the following:
• Each h ∈ H∗ is either nonterminal or infinite.
• P (h) = i for all nonterminal h ∈ H∗ and some i,
• there exists a history h∗ ∈ H∗ such that h∗ ⊆ h for all h ∈ H, and
• if h ∈ H∗ then h′ ∈ H∗ for all h′ with h∗ ⊂ h′ ⊂ h.
“Condense” each such H∗ by replacing the set of actions A(h∗) at h∗ s.t. at h∗, agent i
directly chooses among all possible nodes (h, a), where h is a maximal nonterminal history
17Since Si is obviously dominant in M , M(Si(Ri), B−i)RiM(B′) holds for all Ri ∈ Ri, B, B′, h, and h′
with h ∈ Path(Si(Ri), B−i), h′ ∈ Path(B′), P (h) = P (h′) = i, Ii(h) = Ii(h′), and Si(Ri)(h) 6= B′i(h′). So
M(Si(Ri), B−i)RiM(B′) in particular holds whenever h = h′ in the above conditions.
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in H∗ and a ∈ A(h); in addition, for every infinite history h in H∗, add an action to
A(h∗) that chooses a new leaf with the same outcome as h. For every new action a′ that
chooses a node (h, a) from M3, set Ri(h∗, a′) = Ri(h, a); for every new action a′ that
chooses a new leaf with the same outcome as in an infinite history h = (ak)k=1,... of M
3, set
Ri(h∗, a′) = ∩kRi(a1, . . . , ak). Since T is obviously strategyproof in M3, T is also obviously
strategyproof in M4. Furthermore, M4(T(·)) = M3(T(·)) = scf (·).
Define a new mechanism M5 : S5 → Y as follows. Identify a maximal set of histories H∗
in M4 that satisfies all of the following:
• |A(h)| = 1 for all nonterminal h ∈ H∗,
• there exists a history h∗ ∈ H∗ such that h∗ ⊆ h for all h ∈ H, and
• if h ∈ H∗ then h′ ∈ H∗ for all h′ with h∗ ⊂ h′ ⊂ h.
“Condense” each such H∗ by replacing the subtree rooted at the node h∗ with the subtree
rooted at the node h, where h is the maximal history in H∗. If h is infinite, then replace
h∗ with a new leaf with the same outcome as h and the same value of the maps Ri(·) as
h∗. Since T is obviously strategyproof in M4, T is also obviously strategyproof in M5.
Furthermore, M5(T(·)) = M4(T(·)) = scf (·).
By construction, M5 is a gradual revelation mechanism that implements scf .
Lemma A.1. Fix an obviously incentive compatible gradual revelation mechanism M . Let
h be a nonterminal history and let i = P (h). If there exists y ∈ Y (h) s.t. [y]i ∩ Y (h, a) 6=
∅ 6= [y]i ∩ Y (h, a′) for two distinct a, a′ ∈ A(h), and furthermore there exists Ri ∈ Ri(h) s.t.
Ri ranks [y]i at the top among Y (h), then [y]i ∩ Y (h) ⊆ Y ∗h .
Proof of Lemma A.1. Suppose not, and assume w.l.o.g. that y /∈ Y ∗h . Since y /∈ Y ∗h , there
exists a preference profile R−i ∈ R−i(h) (recall that this is equivalent to h ∈ Path(T(R)))
such thatM(T(R)) = y′ /∈ [y]i. Assume w.l.o.g. that Ti(Ri)(h) 6= a′. Since [y]i∩Y (h, a′) 6= ∅,
there exists a preference profile R′ ∈ R(h) (recall that this is equivalent to h ∈ Path(T(R′)))
with T(R′)(h) = a′ such that M(T(R′)) ∈ [y]i. Since M(T(R′))RiyPiy′ = M(T(R)), the
mechanism is not obviously strategyproof, reaching a contradiction.
B Proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Fix any social choice function scf that is implementable via an obvi-
ously strategyproof mechanism. By Theorem 3.1, scf must be implementable by an obviously
incentive compatible gradual revelation mechanism M . Let h, i be such that h is a minimal
history with P (h) = i. Since M is a gradual revelation mechanism, i must have at least two
choices at h (i.e., |A(h)| ≥ 2). Since there are only two possible preferences for i and since
M is a gradual revelation mechanism, there are at most 2 = |Ri| choices for i at h. In sum,
we have |A(h)| = 2. Moreover, there exists no h′ with h ( h′ and P (h′) = i, since i already
fully reveals his preference at h. By Lemma A.1, Y ∗h 6= ∅. So, h must be covered by one of
the three above cases.
To see that any proto-dictatorship is obviously strategyproof, it is enough to analyze
histories h in which Y ∗h = {y} and A∗h = {a˜} with Y (a˜) = {y, z} (histories h with Y ∗h = {z}
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are analyzed analogously, and in histories h with Y ∗h = {y, z}, the choosing agent is a
dictator). In this case, P (h) ensures that the outcome is y if y is his preferred option. If z
is his preferred option, then choosing a˜ is obviously strategyproof: the best outcome under
the deviation to ensuring y is identical to the worst outcome given a˜.
C Proof of Lemmas 5.2 through 5.6
Proof of Lemma 5.2. As outlined in Section 5.
For Lemmas C.1 through C.3 and 5.3 through 5.6, fix an obviously incentive compatible
gradual revelation mechanism M that implements a given social choice function, with the
following property: For each nonterminal history h of M , there does not exist another
obviously incentive compatible gradual revelation mechanism M ′ that implements the same
social choice function as M and such that M and M ′ coincide except for the subtree at h, and
such that |A∗h| is at most 1 at M , but greater than 1 at M ′. Such an M always exists: start
with any obviously incentive compatible gradual revelation mechanism M ′ that implements
the given social choice function, and then, considering first each nodes h in the first level
in the tree of M ′, if h violates the above condition, replace the subtree at h with another
subtree that satisfies the above condition. Next replace all subtrees that violate the above
condition at nodes in the second level, then in the third, and so forth. Since each node does
not change any more after some finite number of steps (equal to the level of this node), the
resulting mechanism is well defined, even though the height of the tree of M (and so the
number of steps in the process defining M) may be infinite.
Fix an obviously incentive compatible gradual revelation mechanism M that implements
a unanimous social choice function. Assume that M satisfies the above property and assume
w.l.o.g. that P (∅) = 1.
Lemma C.1. Let h be a nonterminal history in M and let i = P (h). Let y ∈ Y s.t. y ∈
Y (h, a) and y+1 ∈ Y (h, a′) for two distinct a, a′ ∈ A(h). If there exist18 Ri : y, y+1 ∈ Ri(h)
and R′i : y+1 ∈ Ri(h) (or Ri : y ∈ Ri(h) and R′i : y+1, y ∈ Ri(h)), then {y, y+1}∩Y ∗h 6= ∅.
Proof of Lemma C.1. We prove the lemma for the first case (swapping y and y+1 obtains the
proof for the second case). Suppose that y, y+ 1 /∈ Y ∗h . Assume w.l.o.g. that Ti(Ri)(h) = a.
By Lemma A.1 and by definition of Ri, R
′
i ∈ Ri(h), we have that y, y+1 /∈ Y (h, a)∩Y (h, a′),
so y /∈ Y (h, a′) and y + 1 /∈ Y (h, a). Since y /∈ Y ∗h , there is some preference profile R−i ∈
R−i(h) with M(T(R)) = y′ 6= y. Since the second ranked choice under Ri, namely y + 1, is
not in Y (h, a), we have y′ 6= y + 1. Since y + 1 ∈ Y (h, a′), there exists a preference profile
R′ ∈ R(h) with Ti(R′i)(h) = a′ and M(T(R)) = y + 1. A contradiction to the obvious
strategyproofness arises, since y + 1 = M(T(R′))PiM(T(R)) = y′.
Lemma C.2. Let i ∈ N and let h be a minimal nonterminal history in M s.t. P (h) = i. If
Y (h) = Y , then Y ∗h 6= ∅.
18Similarly to notation of other sections, we use, e.g., Ri : y, y + 1 to denote a preference Ri for agent i
that ranks y first and y + 1 second.
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Proof of Lemma C.2. Suppose Y ∗h = ∅. Since M is a gradual revelation mechanism, A(∅)
must contain at least two choices. So, there exists y ∈ Y such that y ∈ Y (h, a), y + 1 ∈
Y (h, a′) for a 6= a′ and y, y+1 /∈ Y ∗h (and recall that Ri(h) = Ri), a contradiction to Lemma
C.1. So Y ∗h must be nonempty.
Proof of Lemma 5.3. By Lemma C.2, Y ∗∅ 6= ∅. Let y∗ < y◦ be two policies in Y ∗∅ . Suppose
we had y′ ∈ (y∗, y◦) ∩ Y but y′ /∈ Y ∗∅ . Since y′ /∈ Y ∗∅ , there exists a preference profile R
such that R1 ranks y
′ at the top but the outcome of the mechanism is M(T(R)) = y˜ 6= y′.
Assume without loss of generality that y˜ < y′.
Define two preference profiles R′ and R′′−1 such that R
′
i : y˜ and R
′′
i : y
′ for all i 6= 1,
and such that R′1 : y
′ and R′1 ranks y
◦ strictly above y˜. Starting with the profile R and
inductively switching the preference of each agent i 6= 1 from Ri to R′i, the strategyproofness
of M implies that M(T(R1, R
′
−1)) = y˜. Since R
′
1 ranks y
◦ strictly above y˜, since y◦ ∈ Y ∗∅ ,
since R′1 is single peaked, and since M is strategyproof, we have that M(T(R
′)) ∈ (y˜, y◦].
Assume for contradiction that M(T(R′)) > y′. Since y˜ < y′, since R′2 : y˜, and since by
strategyproofness for we have (similarly to he above argument for R′) that M(T(R′′2, R
′
−2)) >
y˜, we have that M(T(R′′2, R
′
−2)) ≥M(T(R′)) holds by strategyproofness. (Indeed, if we had
M(T(R′)) > M(T(R′′2, R
′
−2)) > y˜ then agent 2 with preference R
′
2 would have an incentive to
lie.) Inductively switching the preference of each agent i 6= 1 from R′i to R′′i and applying the
preceding argument, we obtain that M(T(R′1, R
′′
−1)) ≥M(T(R′)). Since M(T(R′)) > y′ we
obtain a contradiction to unanimity, which requires M(T(R′1, R
′′
−1)) = y
′ as all preferences
in (R′1, R
′
−1) have the ideal point y
′. Therefore, M(T(R′)) ≤ y′.
Therefore, M(T(R1, R
′
−1)) = y˜ < M(T(R
′)) ≤ y′, and so M(T(R′))P1M(T(R1, R′−1)),
contradicting the strategyproofness of M . So we must have y′ ∈ Y ∗∅ , and therefore y′ ∈ Y ∗∅
is a nonempty “interval”.
Lemma C.3. Let h be a nonterminal history. If A∗h = {a} for some action a, then for every
y∗ ∈ Y ∗h , either y∗ ≤ Y (h, a) or y∗ ≥ Y (h, a).
Proof of Lemma C.3. Let i = P (h). Assume for contradiction that X = {y ∈ Y (h, a) | y <
y∗} and Z = {y ∈ Y (h, a) | y > y∗} are both nonempty for some y∗ ∈ Y ∗h . Let
YX = {Ri ∈ Ri(h) | Ti(Ri)(h) = a & the peak of Ri is ≤ y∗},
YZ = {Ri ∈ Ri(h) | Ti(Ri)(h) = a & the peak of Ri is > y∗}.
We claim that for every Ri ∈ YX , for every R−i ∈ R−i(h) it is the case that M(T(R)) ∈
X∪{y∗}. Indeed, if M(T(R)) ∈ Z, then we would have a contradiction to strategyproofness
because at h agent i can ensure that the outcome is y∗, which he prefers over M(T(R)) > y∗.
Similarly, for every Ri ∈ YZ , for every R−i ∈ R−i(h) it is the case that M(T(R)) ∈ Z ∪{y∗}.
Since X and Z are nonempty, YX and YZ are nonempty as well. (Otherwise we would have
a contradiction to the fact that Y (h, a) contains the disjoint union of X and Y , and possibly
also y∗.)
Define two new two new distinct actions l and r. Let Ri(l) = YX and let l lead to a copy
of the subtree that a leads to, where all choices outside Ri(l) have been pruned. Similarly
Let Ri(r) = YZ and let r lead to a copy of the subtree that a leads to, where all choices
outside Ri(r) have been pruned. Define a new tree by replacing a ∈ A(h) with the two
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new actions l and r. If this new mechanism Mˆ is obviously incentive compatible (under the
above-defined truthtelling strategy), then it implements the same social choice function as
the original mechanism, and so our assumption that if |A∗h| = 1 then no modification can
result in |A∗h| > 1 is violated. (Note that indeed we have in Mˆ that l, r ∈ A∗h and so |A∗h| = 2,
since by gradual revelation any preference Ri that chooses a in the original mechanism does
not ensure the final outcome, and so also every preference Ri that chooses l or r in Mˆ does
not ensure the final outcome.)
To see that the new mechanism Mˆ is indeed obviously incentive compatible (under the
above-defined truthtelling strategy), note that for every history h′ that is not a subhistory
of h, the conditions for obvious strategyproofness do not change, while for every history h′
that is a strict subhistory of h, when a player makes a choice, he faces a pruned version of
the subtree he faced in the original mechanism, and therefore obvious strategyproofness is
maintained. It remains to show that obvious strategyproofness is not violated for i at h.
Indeed, obvious strategyproofness when playing any action in A∗h is maintained since i would
— under the original mechanism and under Mˆ — for any deviation at best get his best choice
from Y (h), which has not changed. Similarly, obvious strategyproofness when playing l or r
is maintained w.r.t. deviating to forcing some outcome, because the worst outcome when
playing l or r in Mˆ is no worse than the worst outcome when playing a in the original
mechanism, and deviation was not incentivized there. Finally, obvious strategyproofness
when playing l is maintained w.r.t. deviating to playing r, since the best outcome that a
type that chooses l (and by definition has peak ≤ y∗) can get by playing r is no better
than y∗ (since all possible outcomes when playing r are in Z ∪ {y∗} and therefore are ≥ y∗),
however the worst outcome such a type gets when playing l is ≤ y∗. Similarly, obvious
strategyproofness when playing r is maintained w.r.t. deviating to playing l as well.
Proof of Lemma 5.4. Assume that H∗ < ∞ (the proof when H∗ = ∞ and L∗ > −∞ is
analogous to the proof when H∗ < ∞ and L∗ = −∞). Assume for contradiction that
there exist two different actions a, a′ ∈ A(∅) such that Y (a) ∩ [H∗ + 1,∞) 6= ∅ 6= Y (a′) ∩
[H∗ + 1,∞). So there must exist some y > H∗ such that y ∈ Y (a) and y + 1 ∈ Y (a′),
a contradiction to Lemma C.1. Therefore there is at most one action r ∈ A(∅) such that
Y (r) ∩ [H∗ + 1,∞) 6= ∅. By unanimity, ⋃a∈A(∅) Y (a) = Y , and so for each y ∈ [H∗ + 1,∞)
there must exist an action a such that y ∈ Y (a). By the preceding two statements, there
exists a unique action r ∈ A(∅) s.t. Y (r) ∩ [H∗ + 1,∞) 6= ∅, and furthermore, Y (r) ⊇
[H∗ + 1,∞) ∩ Z.
Assume for contradiction that H∗ /∈ Y (r). Consider the preference profile R1 that ranks
H∗ + 1 first, and ranks H∗ second. By unanimity, T1(R1)(∅) = r (as no other action has
H∗ + 1 as a possible outcome), however, since H∗ + 1 /∈ Y ∗∅ , we have that there exists a
preference profile R−i ∈ R−i s.t. M(T(R)) 6= H∗ + 1. Therefore, since H∗ ∈ Y ∗∅ , we obtain
a contradiction to obvious strategyproofness. Therefore, Y (r) ⊇ [H∗,∞) ∩ Z.
Mutatis mutandis if L∗ > −∞. there exists a unique action l ∈ A(∅) s.t. Y (l) ∩
(−∞, L∗ − 1] 6= ∅, and furthermore, Y (l) ⊇ (−∞, L∗] ∩ Z. We note that we have not
yet determined whether or not l = r.
To complete the proof, we reason by cases. Assume first that either L∗ = −∞ or r 6= l.
Therefore, if L∗ > −∞, then Y (r) ∩ (−∞, L∗ − 1] = ∅, and so Y (r) ⊆ [L∗,∞) ∩ Z. As
regardless of whether or not L∗ > −∞, we have in the current case that Y (r) ⊆ [L∗,∞)∩Z,
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to complete the proof for this case, it is enough to show that Y (r) ∩ [L∗, H∗ − 1] = ∅.
Assume for contradiction that there exists y ∈ Y (r) ∩ [L∗, H∗ − 1]. Therefore, there exists
a preference profile R s.t. T1(R1)(∅) = r and M(T(R)) = y. Since the mechanism is a
gradual revelation mechanism, there exists y′ ∈ Y (r) \ {y} and a preference profile R′−1
s.t. M(T(R1, R
′
−1)) = y
′. By strategyproofness and since y ∈ Y ∗∅ , we have that y′R1y. If
yR1y
′ as well, then the peak y′′ of R1 is between y and y′; by strategyproofness, therefore
y′′ ∈ Y (r) \ Y ∗∅ and so y′′ > H∗. If y′P1y, then by strategyproofness, y′ /∈ Y ∗∅ ; therefore, as
y′ ∈ Y (r), we have that y′ > H∗. Either way, there exists y′′ > H∗ that R1 ranks strictly
above y. Since H∗ > y, we therefore obtain a contradiction to strategyproofness, as H∗ ∈ Y ∗∅
is preferred by R1 over M(T(R)) = y.
It remains to consider the case in which L∗ > −∞ (recall also that H∗ <∞) and r = l,
but such a setting is impossible, as it contradicts Lemma C.3.
Proof of Lemma 5.5. Let j = P (h′) and i = P (h). To see that there is no action a′ at h with
Y (h, a′) ⊆ [F +2,∞), suppose there was such an action. Consider a profile of preferences
R with Rj : F + 1, F , with Rk : F + 1 for all k ∈ N \ {i, j}, and with Ri ∈ Ri(h, a′).
(Since for each k 6= i, agent k’s ideal point is larger than F , we have that R reaches h.)
Since Y (h, a′) ⊆ [F + 2,∞), necessarily M(T(R)) ≥ F + 2. This is a contradiction to
strategyproofness, since j strictly prefers F to F +2 and M(T(R′j, R−j)) = F for R
′
j : F
(since F ∈ Y ∗h′). There is in sum no action a′ at h with Y (h, a′) ⊆ [F+2,∞).
Since Y (h) = [F,∞) ∩ Z and since there is more than one action in A(h) (by gradual
revelation), Lemma C.1 yields Y ∗h 6= ∅. If Y ∗h did intersect [F +2,∞), there would be an
action a′ ∈ A(h) with Y (h, a′) ⊆ [F +2,∞), a contradiction to the preceding paragraph.
Therefore, ∅ 6= Y ∗h ⊆ {F, F+1}.
Let G := maxY ∗h . Since Y (h) = ∪a′∈A(h)Y (h, a′), there exists some action a′ ∈ A(h) such
that [G+1,∞)∩Y (h, a′) 6= ∅. By Lemma C.1, there is at most one such action, call it r. In
sum we have [G+1,∞)∩Z ⊆ Y (h, r). To see that G ∈ Y (h, r), suppose not. Let Ri : G+1, G.
(Ri ∈ Ri(h) since agent i’s ideal point is larger than F .) We note that truthtelling for agent
i requires choosing r at h. Since G+1 /∈ Y ∗h , there exists R−i ∈ R−i(h) s.t. M(T(R)) 6= G+1.
Since G /∈ Y (h, r), we furthermore have that M(T(R)) 6= G. Therefore, i strictly prefers
G to M(T(R)), even though G ∈ Y ∗h — a contradiction to strategyproofness. In sum we
have that [G,∞)∩Z ⊆ Y (h, r), and that for every a′ ∈ A(h) \ {r}, the set Y (h, a′) does not
intersect [G+1,∞). We complete the proof by reasoning over cases.
If Y ∗h = {F}, then since G = F we have that Y (h, r) ⊇ [F,∞) ∩ Z and so Y (h, r) =
[F,∞) ∩ Z. Since for any action a′ 6= r, the set Y (h, a′) does not intersect [G+1,∞) =
[F+1,∞), we therefore have that A∗h = {r}, as required.
The two remaining cases are those where Y ∗h is either {F, F+1} or {F+1}. In either of
these cases, since G = F+1, we have that Y (h, r) ⊇ [F+1,∞) ∩ Z and that for any action
a′ 6= r, the set Y (h, a′) does not intersect [F+2,∞), i.e., Y (h, a′) ⊆ {F, F+1}.
Assume first that Y ∗h = {F, F+1}. Since any action a′ 6= r at h has Y (h, a) ⊆ {F, F+1} =
Y ∗h , by gradual revelation and strategyproofness, a
′ ∈ A∗h. Therefore, A∗h = {r}. It remains
to show that Y (h, r) = [F+1,∞) ∩ Z, i.e., that F /∈ Y (h, r). Note that for preferences with
ideal point ≤ F +1, agent i can force at h his most-preferred option from Y (h), and so,
by gradual revelation and strategyproofness, chooses an action in A∗h, i.e., an action other
than r. Therefore, agent i chooses r only if her ideal point is greater than F+1. Assume for
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contradiction that F ∈ Y (h, r). Therefore, there exists some preference profile R ∈ R(h, r)
with M(T(R)) = F . Since Ri chooses r at h, the ideal point of Ri is greater than F+1, so
Ri strictly prefers F+1 (which he can force at h) to F = M(T(R)) — a contradiction to
strategyproofness. So Y (h, r) = [F+1,∞) ∩ Z, as required.
Finally, assume that Y ∗h = {F+1}. By Lemma C.3, we have either Y (h, r) ≤ F+1 or
Y (h, r) ≥ F+1. Therefore, Y (h, r) = [F+1,∞) ∩ Z. Since F ∈ Y (h) and F /∈ Y ∗h , there
exists an action a ∈ A∗h s.t. F ∈ Y (h, a) and |Y (h, a)| > 1. Since Y (h, a) ⊆ {F, F +1},
we have that Y (h, a) = {F, F+1}. Therefore, since F+1 ∈ Y ∗h , by gradual revelation and
strategyproofness every Ri ∈ Ri(h) that chooses a at h has peak ≤ F . In particular, since
Ri(h, a) 6= ∅, there exists Ri ∈ Ri(h) that has peak ≤ F . Therefore, since F /∈ Y ∗h , we
have by Lemma A.1 that no other action a′ ∈ A(h) \ {a} has F ∈ Y (h, a′). Therefore (and
since for any a′ ∈ A(h) \ {r} we have Y (h, a′) ⊆ {F, F+1}), we conclude that any action
a′ ∈ A(h) \ {a, r} has Y (h, a′) = {F+1}, and so A∗h = {a, r}, as required.
Proof of Lemma 5.6. Completely analogous the the proof of Lemma 5.5.
D Proof of Theorem 6.1
Proof of Theorem 6.1. Assume the contrary. Call the goods a and b and the bidders 1 and
2. We denote by (v(a), v(b)) the preferences induced by a valuation of v(a) for good a and
v(b) for good b.
We first consider the possible outcomes when the preferences of each bidder belong to
the set {(20, 2), (8, 8), (6, 6)}. (For ease of presentation, we make no attempt to choose
particularly low valuations or to tighten the analysis of utilities below.)
If both bidders have the same preferences (v(a), v(b)), then we claim that the utility of
each bidder is at most 2. (Under VCG with the Clarke pivot rule, the utility of each bidder
would be 0.) Since in this case any allocation is welfare maximizing, we reason by cases.
• If bidder 1 is awarded both goods and bidder 2 is awarded no good, then bidder 2 is
charged nothing. Assume for contradiction that bidder 1 is charged less than v(a) +
v(b)− 2. Then, bidder 1 with preferences (v(a)− 1, v(b)− 1) (with the preferences of
bidder 2 unchanged), who would get no good if declaring his true preferences (and thus
have utility 0), would rather misrepresent himself as (v(a), v(b)) and get both goods
(and have strictly positive utility), in contradiction to strategyproofness. So, the utility
of bidder 1 is at most v(a) + v(b)− (v(a) + v(b)− 2) = 2. The case in which bidder 2
is awarded both goods and bidder 1 is awarded no good is analyzed analogously.
• If bidder 1 is awarded a and bidder 2 is awarded b, then assume for contradiction that
bidder 1 is charged less than v(a)−1. In this case, bidder 1 with preferences (v(a)−1, 0)
(with the preferences of bidder 2 unchanged), who would get no good if declaring
his true preferences (and thus have utility 0), would rather misrepresent himself as
(v(a), v(b)) and get good a (and have strictly positive utility), in contradiction to
strategyproofness. So, the utility of bidder 1 is at most v(a)−(v(a)−1) = 1. Similarly,
bidder 2 is charged at least v(b) − 1 and so has utility at most 1. The case in which
bidder 2 is awarded a and bidder 1 is awarded b is is analyzed analogously.
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If bidder 1 has preferences (20, 2) and bidder 2 has preferences (8, 8), then bidder 1 gets
good a and bidder 2 gets good b. In this case, bidder 1 is charged at most 9. Indeed,
to see this note that if bidder 1 had preferences (9, 2) (with the preferences of bidder 2
unchanged), then he would also get good a, but by strategyproofness would be charged at
most 9 as otherwise his utility would be negative and he would have rather misrepresented
his preferences to be (0, 0) for a utility of 0. Therefore, since bidder 1 with preferences (20, 2)
has no incentive to misrepresent his preferences as (9, 2), he is charged at most 9 as well.
Similarly, bidder 2 is charged at most 3. (Under VCG with the Clarke pivot rule, they would
be charged 8 and 2, respectively.) Similarly, if bidder 1 has preferences (8, 8) and bidder 2
has preferences (20, 2), then bidder 1 is charged at most 3 and bidder 2 is charged at most 9.
If bidder 1 has preferences (20, 2) and bidder 2 has preferences (6, 6), then bidder 1 gets
good a and bidder 2 gets good b. In this case, similarly to the above analysis, bidder 1 is
charged at most 7 and bidder 2 is charged at most 3. (Under VCG with the Clarke pivot
rule, they would be charged 6 and 2, respectively.) Similarly, if bidder 1 has preferences
(6, 6) and bidder 2 has preferences (20, 2), then bidder 1 is charged at most 3 and bidder 2
is charged at most 7.
Finally, If bidder 1 has preferences (8, 8) and bidder 2 has preferences (6, 6), then bidder 1
gets both goods and bidder 2 gets no good (and is charged nothing). In this case, bidder 1
is charged at most 14. Indeed, to see this note that if bidder 1 had preferences (7, 7)
(with the preferences of bidder 2 unchanged), then he would also get both goods, but by
strategyproofness would be charged at most 14 as otherwise his utility would be negative and
he would have rather misrepresented his preferences to be (0, 0) for a utility of 0. Therefore,
since bidder 1 with preferences (8, 8) has no incentive to misrepresent his preferences as (7, 7),
he is charged at most 14 as well. (Under VCG with the Clarke pivot rule, bidder 1 would be
charged 12.) Similarly, if bidder 1 has preferences (6, 6) and bidder 2 has preferences (8, 8),
then bidder 1 is charged nothing and bidder 2 is charged at most 14.
To see that the given social choice function cannot be implemented by a strategyproof
mechanism, suppose it could, and let Mˆ be an obviously incentive compatible gradual rev-
elation mechanism that implements it. We now prune Mˆ by restricting the preferences of
both bidders to only be in the set {(20, 2), (8, 8), (6, 6)}, to obtain an obviously incentive
compatible gradual revelation mechanism M for the restricted preference domain.
Assume without loss of generality that P (∅) = 1. Since the choice of bidder 1 at ∅ is real
(i.e., more than one action exists), then since bidder 1 has only three possible preferences,
some action a is chosen by a single preference of bidder 1, and so reveals his preferences (any
other preference for bidder 1 chooses an action different from a). We reach a contradiction
by reason by cases.
If action a is chosen by the preferences (20, 2), then the minimal utility bidder 1 can get by
reporting truthfully is at most 2 (when bidder 2 has preferences (20, 2) as well). Nonetheless,
the maximal utility bidder 1 can get by deviating by misreporting his preferences as (8, 8)
is at least 22− 14 = 8 > 2 (when bidder 2 has preferences (6, 6)). This contradicts obvious
strategyproofness.
If action a is chosen by the preferences (8, 8), then the minimal utility bidder 1 can get by
reporting truthfully is at most 2 (when bidder 2 has preferences (8, 8) as well). Nonetheless,
the maximal utility bidder 1 can get by deviating by misreporting his preferences as (6, 6)
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is at least 8 − 3 = 5 > 2 (when bidder 2 has preferences (20, 2)). This contradicts obvious
strategyproofness.
Finally, if action a is chosen by the preferences (6, 6), then the minimal utility bidder 1
can get by reporting truthfully is at most 2 (when bidder 2 has preferences (6, 6) as well).
Nonetheless, the maximal utility bidder 1 can get by deviating by misreporting his preferences
as (8, 8) is at least 6 − 3 = 3 > 2 (when bidder 2 has preferences (20, 2)). This contradicts
obvious strategyproofness.
E Proof of Theorem 7.2
Before beginning our analysis of housing problems, we introduce some more notation, which
helps simplify it. While Y ∗h has been defined as the set of outcomes that agent P (h) can
enforce at h, we here somewhat abuse notation by considering Y ∗h as the set of houses that
agent P (h) can choose to be matched with at h. So o ∈ Y ∗h means that P (h) as an action
a ∈ A(h) such that P (h) is matched with o for any outcome y associated with a terminal
history h′ with (h, a) ⊆ h′. While M(B) generally denotes the outcome of the mechanism
M given the behavior profile B, we here let M(B)(i) be the house that i is matched with
under the outcome M(B). Since the agents’ preferences over matchings are functions of
their preferences over the houses they are matched with, and since only a few top- and
bottom-ranked houses matter for many of our arguments, we write Ri : o for an (arbitrary)
preference Ri that ranks house o at the top. Similarly Ri : o, o
′ denotes a preference that
ranks o above o′, which it ranks in turn above all other houses. This definition is extended to
lists of any length. Analogously, Ri : . . . , o denotes a preference that ranks o at the bottom,
and Ri : o
′, . . . , o denotes a preference that ranks o′ at the top and o at the bottom.
Lemma E.1. Any social choice function implemented via sequential barter with lurkers is
Pareto-optimal. Moreover, such a social choice function can be OSP-implemented.
Proof of Lemma E.1. As outlined in Section 7.
Theorem 3.1 shows that any OSP implementable rule is implementable via an obviously
incentive compatible gradual revelation mechanism. So, to show the converse direction, it
is sufficient to show that any Pareto optimal rule that is implementable via an obviously
incentive compatible gradual revelation mechanism that corresponds to sequential barter
with lurkers. For the reminder of the proof, let M be an obviously incentive compatible
gradual revelation mechanism that implements a Pareto optimal rule. Since R is finite, all
histories in M are finite.
Definition E.2. Let h be a history of M and i ∈ N an agent.
1. Oi(h) := {o : M(T(R))(i) = o for some R ∈ R(h)} is the set of houses assigned to i in
any terminal history following on h.
2. Agent i is matched to house o at h if Oi(h) = {o}.
3. Di(h) := {o : o ∈ Y ∗h′ for some h′ ⊆ h with P (h′) = i} is the set of houses that agent i
can choose to be matched with at some subhistory of h.
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4. D<i (h) := {o : o ∈ Y ∗h′ for some h′ ( h with P (h′) = i} = Di(h′) for h = (h′, a) is the
set of houses that agent i can choose to be matched with at some strict subhistory of
h.
5. If P (h) = i, then we say that agent i moves at h. If P (h′) = i for a strict subhistory
h′ of h, then we say that i moves before h.
Remark E.3. Oi(h) is (weakly) decreasing in h, while Di(h) and D
<
i (h) are both (weakly)
increasing in h. D<i (h) is always a subset of Di(h), and that i moves at h if Di(h) and
D<i (h) differ.
Lemma E.4. Fix a history h of M and let i = P (h).
1. There exists at most one action a ∈ A∗h — denote it by a˜.
2. The behavior induced by the truthtelling strategy for a preference Ri ∈ Ri(h) at h is as
follows. Let o = maxRi Oi(h).
• If o ∈ Y ∗h , then there is an action a ∈ A∗ such that {Ri} = Ri(h, a), and further-
more, Oi(h, a) = {o}. Choose this action.
• Otherwise, the action a˜ exists. Choose this action.
Note that Lemma E.4 implies that Ri(h, a˜) equals {Ri ∈ Ri(h) | maxRi Oi(h) /∈ Y ∗h }.
Moreover, an action other than a˜ is chosen by some agent if and only if by choosing this
action, this agent is matched with their most preferred house among all houses they could
possibly be matched with at h; each such agent fully reveals her preference to the mechanism
when making this choice.
Proof of Lemma E.4. We start with a preliminary observation, which states a sufficient con-
dition for A∗h to be a singleton.
(*) Fix h, i such that P (h) = i. If for all o, o′ ∈ Oi(h) \ Di(h) with o 6= o′ there exists
some Ri ∈ Ri(h) with Ri : o, o′, then A∗h is a singleton.
Suppose that Observation (*) does not hold, that is, suppose there exist two different
actions a and a′ in A∗h under the condition of the observation. Since M is a gradual revelation
mechanism, Ri(h, a) 6= ∅. Say Ri ∈ Ri(h, a) and let o := maxRi Oi(h). Since o ∈ Oi(h),
we have by strategyproofness that o ∈ Oi(h, a). Since a ∈ A∗h, there exists a profile R ∈
R(h, a) such that M(T(R))(i) 6= o. Therefore, o /∈ Di(h), for otherwise Ti(Ri) would
not be a best reply to T−i(R−i). By the same reasons, there exists a R′i ∈ Ri(h, a′) with
o′ = maxR′i Oi(h) ∈ Oi(h, a′) \ Di(h). Since o′ /∈ Di(h), we have by gradual revelation that
o′ /∈ Y ∗h , and therefore, by Lemma A.1 we have that o′ /∈ Oi(h, a). In particular, o 6= o′. By
assumption, Ri(h) therefore contains a preference R′′i : o, o′. The truthtelling strategy for
R′′i cannot prescribe a at h, as for any behavior that chooses a at h, agent i may be matched
(i.e., is matched, for some R−i) with a house in Oi(h, a) \ {o}, while for some behavior that
chooses a′ at h, agent i may be matched (i.e., is matched, for some, possibly different, R′−i)
with o′, which he strictly R′′i -prefers to each house in Oi(h, a) \ {o}. So the truthtelling
strategy for R′′i must prescribe an action a
′′ 6= a at h. But since o /∈ Di(h), it follows that for
33
any behavior that chooses a′′ at h, agent i may be matched with an outcome other than o,
while for some behavior that chooses a at h, agent i may be matched with o. There is, in
sum, no obviously incentive compatible strategy for R′′i .
We now fix an agent i and prove both parts of the lemma by full induction over histories
h with P (h) = i. If h∗ is minimal among the set of such histories, then Ri(h∗) = Ri and the
condition in Observation (*) (and therefore, Part 1) is satisfied. We next show that Part 2
holds at a history h if Part 1 does. Finally, we argue that the condition in Observation (*)
holds at h if Parts 1 and 2 hold for all strict subhistories h′ ( h with P (h′) = i.
Assume that Part 1 holds at a history h with P (h) = i. Let Ri ∈ Ri(h) and let
o = maxRi Oi(h). If o ∈ Y ∗h , then by definition there exists an action a′ with Oi(h, a′) = {o}.
The truthtelling strategy for Ri must prescribe an action a with Oi(h, a) = {o}: by gradual
revelation, any behavior that does not immediately (i.e., by the action it specifies at h)
enforce that i is matched with h, does not enforce it as a behavior as well; that is, when
playing any such behavior, agent i may be matched (i.e., is matched, for some R−i) to an
Ri-inferior house than when choosing a
′ at h. Therefore, the truthtelling strategy for Ri must
prescribe at h an action a with Oi(h, a) = {o}. Since M is a gradual revelation mechanism,
we have Ri(h, a) = {Ri}.
Now suppose that o /∈ Y ∗h . By Part 1, it is enough to show that the truthtelling strategy
for Ri prescribes an action a ∈ A∗h (and so, by Part 1, a = a˜). Suppose that the truthtelling
strategy for Ri prescribes an action a ∈ A∗h, so Oi(h, a) = {o′} for some o′ ∈ Y ∗h , so o′ 6= o.
Since o ∈ Oi(h), by gradual revelation there must exist some R′ ∈ R(h) with M(T(R′))(i) =
o, so the Ri-best possible house when choosing a
′ = T(R′i)(h) at h (namely o) is strictly
Ri-preferred to the Ri-worst possible house when choosing a at h (namely o
′ 6= o), and the
choice of a at h is not obviously strategyproof for Ri.
Finally, assume that Parts 1 and 2 hold for all strict subhistories h′ ( h with P (h′) = i.
The condition in Observation (*) is trivially satisfied if Oi(h)\Di(h) is a singleton, so suppose
that |Oi(h)\Di(h)| ≥ 2. Therefore, by the induction hypothesis for Part 1, agent i chooses a˜
in all strict subhistories of h. Let o, o′ ∈ Oi(h)\Di(h) be distinct, and let Ri : o, o′; since Di(·)
and Oi(·) are respectively weakly increasing and weakly decreasing, we have that Oi(·)\Di(·)
is weakly decreasing. Since o ∈ Oi(h)\Di(h), we therefore have that o ∈ Oi(h′)\Di(h′) for all
strict subhistories h′ ( h. Therefore, by the induction hypothesis for Part 2, the truthtelling
strategy for Ri prescribes the choice of a˜ at every such h
′. Therefore, Ri ∈ Ri(h), and the
sufficient condition cited in Observation (*) holds.
Definition E.5. Let h be a history of M and let i ∈ N .
1. Agent i is active at h if Di(h) 6= ∅ and |Oi(h)| > 1.
2. Agent i can force a house o at h if he has a behavior for which he is matched with o
if h is reached. (I.e., there exists Ri ∈ Ri(h) such that o = M(T(R))(i) holds for all
R−i ∈ R−i(h).)
3. Agent i is a dictator at h if he can force every house in Oi(h) at h. (I.e., if R ∈ R(h),
then M(T(R))(i) depends only on Ri.)
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Remark E.6. No part of Definition E.5 assumes that i = P (h).
Remark E.7. If i is a dictator at h, then it holds that Oi(h) = {maxRiOi(h) | for some Ri ∈
Ri(h)}.
Lemma E.8. Fix a history h of M and an agent i who has moved before or at h.
1. If o = maxRi Oi(h) ∈ Di(h) holds for some Ri ∈ Ri(h), then i can force o at h.
2. If i is not a dictator at h, then Di(h) ( Oi(h).
Proof of Lemma E.8.
1. Since o ∈ Di(h), there is a history h′ ⊆ h with P (h′) = i and o ∈ Y ∗h′ . Since i may
deviate to a behavior that chooses an action a at h′ with Oi(h′, a) = {o}, agent i
with the given preference Ri must weakly prefer M(T(R))(i) ∈ Oi(h) to o for any
R−i ∈ R−i(h). Therefore, since o = maxRi Oi(h), we have that M(T(R))(i) = o for
any R−i ∈ R−i(h), and so agent i can force o at h.
2. Since i is not a dictator at h, there exists Ri ∈ Ri(h) such that i cannot force at h the
house o = maxRi Oi(h). By Part 1, therefore o /∈ Di(h). In particular, Oi(h) 6= Di(h).
It therefore remains to show that Di(h) ⊆ Oi(h). Let d ∈ Di(h). Consider the
preference R′i : o, d. Since o ∈ Oi(h) \ Di(h), by Lemma E.4 we have that R′i ∈
Ri(h). Since i cannot force the house o at h, there exist preferences R−i ∈ R−i(h)
such that M(T(R′i, R−i))(i) 6= o. Since M is strategyproof and since d ∈ Di(h),
agent i must weakly R′i-prefer M(T(R
′
i, R−i))(i) to d. Since R
′
i : o, d, we have that
M(T(R′i, R−i))(i) = d, and therefore d ∈ Oi(h).
Definition E.9. Let h be a history of M .
• An agent i who has moved before h, but is not a dictator at h is a lurker for a house
o at h if the maximal strict subhistory h′ of h with P (h′) = i is such that o ∈ Oi(h′)
and Di(h
′) = Oi(h′) \ {o}.
• O(h) is the union of the sets Oi(h) for all agents i that are not yet matched at h.
• G(h) is the set of houses in O(h) that have no lurkers at h.
Lemma E.10. Fix a history h in M , an agent i who is not yet matched at h, and a house
o ∈ Oi(h) that i does not lurk at h. Then there exists Ri ∈ Ri(h) with Ri : . . . , o.
Proof of Lemma E.10. If i does not move at any strict subhistory of h, then Ri(h) = Ri and
the claim trivially holds.
If i is a dictator at h, then Oi(h) = {maxRi Oi(h) | Ri ∈ Ri(h)}. Since i is not yet
matched, then |Oi(h)| > 1. Therefore, there exists R′i ∈ Ri(h) whose top choice among
Oi(h) is some o
′ 6= o. Let Ri be the preference obtained from R′i by demoting o to be least
preferred. Since i is not yet matched at h and since o′ ∈ Oi(h) is ranked by Ri strictly above
o (since o ∈ Oi(h)), by Lemma E.4, we have that Ri ∈ Ri(h) as well.
Finally, if i moves at some strict subhistory of h and is not a dictator, then let h′ ( h
be the maximal strict subhistory of h with P (h′) = i. Since i is not a dictator at h, she
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is not a dictator at h′, and so by Lemma E.8(2), Di(h′) ( Oi(h′). Since i is neither a
dictator nor a lurker for o at h, there exists o′ ∈ Oi(h′) \ (Di(h′) ∪ {o}). By Lemma E.4,
Ri ∈ Ri(h′, a˜) = Ri(h) for every Ri : o′, and in particular for Ri : o′, . . . , o. (Note that (h′, a˜)
is indeed a subhistory of h since i is not yet matched at h.)
Lemma E.11. Fix a history h of M . If an agent i is not yet matched at h, then G(h) ⊆
Oi(h) ∪D<i (h). If an agent i is a lurker at h then G(h) ⊆ D<i (h).
Proof of Lemma E.11. Fix a house o ∈ G(h) such that o /∈ D<i (h). It is enough to show that
o ∈ Oi(h). Let R′i ∈ Ri(h), and let Ri be the preference obtained from R′i by promoting o
to be most preferred. Since i is not yet matched at h and since o /∈ D<i (h), by Lemma E.4
we have that Ri ∈ Ri(h) as well. By Lemma E.10, for every not-yet-matched agent j 6= i
with o ∈ Oj(h), there exists Rj ∈ Rj(h) with Rj : . . . , o. Fix some Rk ∈ Rk(h) for every
other agent k (i.e., matched agent or agent with o /∈ Ok(h); note that matched agents are
not matched to o, since o ∈ G(h) ⊆ O(h)). Note that R ∈ R(h). Since Ri ranks o at the
top while any agent j 6= i with o ∈ Oj(h) ranks o at the bottom, the Pareto optimality of M
implies that M(T(R))(i) = o, and therefore o ∈ Oi(h).
If i lurks some house oi at h then by definition, Oi(h) = {oi} ∪D<i (h). Since by the first
claim G(h) ⊆ Oi(h) ∪D<i (h) = {oi} ∪D<i (h), but by definition oi /∈ G(h), the second claim
follows.
Lemma E.12. Let h be a history of M . Let i be an active agent at h such that some
ol ∈ Di(h) has a lurker at h. Then for every o ∈ G(h), either o ∈ Di(h) or i can force o at
h.
Proof of Lemma E.12. It suffices to show that i can force any o ∈ G(h) \Di(h) at h. Since
o ∈ G(h)\Di(h), by Lemma E.11 we have that o ∈ Oi(h). Since o /∈ Di(h) and ol ∈ Di(h), we
have that o 6= ol. Let l be the lurker of ol; since ol ∈ Di(h), we have that l 6= i. Lemma E.11
and o ∈ G(h) imply o ∈ Dl(h). Since o ∈ Oi(h) \Di(h), we have that Ri : o, ol ∈ Ri(h). We
will show that M(T(R))(i) = o holds for every R−i ∈ R−i(h). Since l is a lurker for ol at h,
we have that ol = maxRl Ol(h). By Lemma E.4, also R
′
l : ol, o ∈ Ri(h). Since ol ∈ Di(h) and
o ∈ Dl(h), i and l respectively must Ri-prefer and R′l-prefer their matches M(T(R′l, R−l))(i)
and M(T(R′l, R−l))(l) to ol and o. Since M is Pareto optimal, M(T(R
′
l, R−l))(i) = o and
M(T(R′l, R−l))(l) = ol. Since M is strategyproof, M(T(R))(l) = ol must also hold. Since
M(T(R))(i)Riol and M(T(R))(i) 6= ol, we have that M(T(R))(i) = o and i can force o by
playing Ri.
Lemma E.13. Let h be a history of M , and let i be an active nonlurker at h. If for every
o ∈ G(h), either o ∈ Di(h) or i can force o at h, then i is a dictator at h.
Proof of Lemma E.13. Assume that i is not a dictator at h. Therefore, there exists ol ∈
Oi(h) \ Di(h) that i cannot force at h. By assumption, ol /∈ G(h), implying that ol has a
lurker, say l, at h. Since i is not a lurker, l 6= i.
If P (h) 6= i let h′ = h; otherwise, let h′ = (h, a˜). (Since i is not a dictator at h, then
a˜ ∈ A∗h and (h, a˜) is a nonterminal history of M .) By gradual revelation, k := P (h′) 6= i. By
Lemma E.4, Y ∗h′ 6= ∅, so there exists o∗ ∈ Y ∗h′ . We conclude the proof by considering three
cases, in each case reaching a contradiction by showing that k cannot force o∗ at h′.
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Case 1: If o∗ ∈ G(h), then by assumption, either o∗ ∈ Di(h) or i can force o∗ at h. If
o∗ ∈ Di(h), Lemma E.8(2) implies that o∗ ∈ Oi(h). Since l is a lurker at h and o∗ ∈ G(h),
by Lemma E.12, we have that o∗ ∈ Dl(h). Fix R−k ∈ R−k(h′) with Ri : ol, o∗ and Rl : ol, o∗.
By strategyproofness, and since either i can force o∗ at h′ or o∗ ∈ Di(h′), we obtain that
M(T(R))({i, l}) = {o, o∗} for every k ∈ Rk(h), so k cannot force o∗ at h′ — a contradiction.
Case 2: If o∗ = ol, then let o′ ∈ G(h). Fix R−k ∈ R−k(h′) with Rl : ol, o′ and Ri : ol, o′.
By the argument of Case 1 with o∗ replaced by o′, we have that M(T(R))({i, l}) = {ol, o′}
for every Rk ∈ Rk(h′), so k cannot force ol = o∗ at h′ — a contradiction.
Case 3: Finally, if o∗ /∈ G(h) and o∗ 6= ol, then o∗ has a lurker, say l∗, at h. Let
o′ ∈ G(h). Note that o∗, ol, o′ are all distinct. Fix R−k ∈ R−k(h′) with Ri : ol, o′, Rl : ol, o′,
and Rl∗ : o
∗, o′. By the argument of Case 2, we have that M(T(R))({i, l}) = {ol, o′} for
every Rk ∈ Rk(h′). Since l∗ is a lurker at h and o′ ∈ G(h), by Lemma E.11 we have that
o′ ∈ Dl∗(h). So M(T(R))(l∗) must by strategyproofness be Rl∗-preferred to o′. Since o′ is
matched to either l or i, then M(T(R))(l∗) must equal o∗, so k cannot force o∗ at h′ — a
contradiction.
The next Lemma combines the two preceding ones to show that any agent i who has a
lurked house ol in his set Di(h) is a dictator at h.
Lemma E.14. Let h be a history of M . Let i be a nonlurker at h such that some ol ∈ Di(h)
has a lurker at h. Then i is a dictator at h.
Proof of Lemma E.14. Assume that i is not a dictator at h, so since ol ∈ Di(h), agent i is
active at h. For every o ∈ G(h), by Lemma E.12 either o ∈ Di(h) or i can force o at h. Since
i is an active nonlurker at h, i is by Lemma E.13 a dictator at h.
Definition E.15. For the remainder of the proof, we assume without loss of generality that
the set of lurkers at a history h (h will be clear from context) is L := {1, . . . , λ}, where l < l′
holds for l, l′ ∈ L if and only if l becomes a lurker at a subhistory of the history at which l′
becomes a lurker (where both are subhistories of h). Moreover, we denote the house lurked
by lurker l by ol.
Lemma E.16. Let h be a history of M .
1. o1, . . . , oλ are distinct.
2. Ol(h) = O(h) \ {o1, . . . , ol−1} holds for all l ∈ L.
Proof of Lemma E.16. We prove the claim by induction over l ∈ L. Assume that the claim
holds for the lurkers 1, . . . , l−1 (and their associate houses) and let hl ( h be the history
at which l becomes a lurker. (So P (hl) = l, and agent l is not a lurker at hl, but is a lurker
at (hl, a˜).) Since l is a lurker at (hl, a˜), Lemma E.11 implies that G(hl) \ {ol} = G(hl, a˜) ⊆
D<l (hl, a˜) = Dl(hl).
Assume for contradiction that ol ∈ {o1, . . . , ol−1}. Therefore, G(hl) = G(hl) \ {ol} ⊆
Dl(hl), and so l, who is an active nonlurker at hl, is by Lemma E.13 a dictator at hl (and
its superhistory h) — a contradiction. In sum, ol is distinct from o1, . . . , ol−1.
Recall that O(h) \ {o1, . . . , ol} = G(hl) \ {ol} ⊆ Dl(hl). If this containment is strict, then
ok ∈ Dl(hl) for some lurker k < l, and therefore, by Lemma E.14, agent l is a dictator at hl
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— a contradiction. So, Dl(hl) = O(h) \ {o1, . . . , ol}. Since Dl(·) and O(·) are respectively
weakly increasing and weakly decreasing, we have Dl(h) = O(h) \ {o1, . . . , ol} as well, and
since l is still a lurker at h, we have that Ol(h) = Dl(h) ∪ {ol} = O(h) \ {o1, . . . , ol−1}, as
required.
Lemma E.17. Let h be a history of M with i = P (h) /∈ L. Let R ∈ R(h) with T(R)(i) =
a ∈ A∗h. Let o be the unique house such that Oi(h, a) = {o}.
• M(T(R))(l) can for each lurker l ∈ L be calculated by the following inductive procedure,
starting with Step 1 and o′ ← o.
Step l:
– If o′ ∈ G(h), then:
1. M(T(R))(k) = ok for each l ≤ k ≤ λ.
– Else:
1. Let l′ ∈ L be the unique lurker such that ol′ = o′.
2. M(T(R))(k) = ok for each l ≤ k < l′
3. M(T(R))(l′) = maxRl′ Dl′(h).
4. If l′ < λ, then go to Step l′ + 1 with o′ ←M(T(R))(l′).
• M(T(R))({i, 1, . . . , λ}) = {o1, . . . , oλ, o′}, where o′ ∈ G(h). If o ∈ G(h), then o′ = o.
Proof of Lemma E.17. To prove Part 1, assume that in the steps preceding step l, lurkers
{1, . . . , l−1} (this set is empty if l = 1) are matched in accordance with the above procedure.
We will show that the matches described in step l are correct. Recall that o′ (as it is defined
for step l) has already been matched to some agent in {i, 1, . . . , l−1}.
If o′ ∈ G(h), then fix some l ≤ k ≤ λ. We must show that k is matched with ok. By
Lemma E.11, G(h) ⊆ Dk(h), and so o′ ∈ Dk(h). If it is the case that Rk = R′k : ok, o′, then
by strategyproofness k must be matched with a house she weakly Rk-prefers to o
′, meaning
that k must be matched at (h, a) with ok. Since k lurks ok at h, we have by Lemma E.4 that
R′k ∈ Rk(h) = Rk(h, a). By strategyproofness and since k lurks ok at h, we therefore have
that k must be matched with ok at (h, a) regardless of whether or not Rk = R
′
k.
It remains to consider the case in which o′ /∈ G(h), i.e., o′ = ol′ for for some l′ ∈ L.
By the preceding steps, l′ ≥ l. (Trivial if l = 1, and otherwise follows from the fact that
ol′ = o
′ ∈ Dl−1(h) and from Lemma E.16.) For every lurker l ≤ k < l′, we have that
o′ = ol′ ∈ Dk(h) and by an argument similar to the one in the preceding paragraph, we have
that k is matched with ok at (h, a). Since ol′ /∈ Ol′(h, a), we have by strategyproofness that
lurker l′ must be matched at (h, a) with his most preferred house o∗ in Dl′(h), as required.
Since there are finitely many lurkers and since at least one lurker is matched at each step,
the process terminates after finitely many steps. The second Part is a direct consequence of
the first.
Lemma E.18. Let h be a history of M with lurked houses. Let t = P (h′) for h′ the maximal
superhistory of h of the form h′ = (h, a˜, a˜, . . . , a˜). Then the agent t is not a lurker at h.
Furthermore, If ol ∈ Ok(h) for some nonlurker k and a lurked house ol at h, then k = t.
Moreover, Dt(h
′) = O(h).
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Proof of Lemma E.18. We start by proving the second statement. Say that ol ∈ Ok(h)\G(h)
holds for some nonlurker k. Let l be the lurker of ol at h; by assumption, l 6= k. Since
ol ∈ Ok(h), there exists some R ∈ R(h) with M(T(R))(k) = ol.
If R /∈ R(h′), then at some h′′ ( h′, the agent i = P (h′′) chooses an action Ti(Ri)(h′′) =
a 6= a˜. Since a 6= a˜, the choice of a by i matches i with some house o′. Since i is not a
dictator at h′, she can by Lemma E.14 only choose a house in G(h) at h, and so o′ ∈ G(h).
By Lemma E.17, following the choice of a by i at h, house ol is matched with agent l rather
than with agent k — a contradiction, so R ∈ R(h′).
Let a = Tt(Rt)(h
′) be agent t’s choice at h′. Note that a 6= a˜ by definition of h′. Therefore,
by Lemma E.4, agent t becomes matched to some house o at (h′, a). By Lemma E.17,
{o1, . . . , oλ} ⊂ M(T(R))(t, 1, . . . , λ). Since 1, . . . , λ are lurkers while k is a not a lurker, we
have that k = t.
The first statement is a direct consequence of the second one: if t is a lurker at h, then no
nonlurker k at h may be possibly matched with any house that is lurked at h, so all lurked
houses, under any superhistory of h, will be matched with lurkers, so by Pareto optimality
each lurker gets her lurked house, so all lurkers are dictators at h — a contradiction.
Finally, we show that Dt(h
′) = O(h). Recall that the oldest lurker at h, agent 1, lurks
house o1. Since 1 is a lurker, there is a profile of preferences R ∈ R(h) with M(T(R))(1) 6= o1.
By Lemma E.16, o1 is not contained in Ol(h) for any lurker l > 1. Since, by the first
statement, t is the only nonlurker with o1 ∈ Ot(h), A(h′) must contain an action a with
Ot(h, a) = {o1}, so o1 ∈ Dt(h′).
If o1 ∈ D<t (h′), then by the second statement and by Lemma E.14, t was given the option
to choose o1 at a strict subhistory of h
′ before 1 became a lurker (since he was not a dictator
when given this option). By the same lemma, t became a dictator immediately when 1
became a lurker, and so at that point t was able to force all remaining houses in O(h) that
she could not force before. Since the next move of t after that is a dictatorial one, it is at
h′, and so Dt(h′) = O(h), as required. Assume henceforth, therefore, that o1 /∈ D<t (h′), and
assume for contradiction that there exists a house o′ ∈ O(h) \Dt(h′).
Since 1 is the oldest lurker at h and since o′ 6= o1, Lemma E.16 implies o′ ∈ D1(h).
For every R ∈ R(h′) with Rt : o′, o1 (this preference indeed reaches h′ since o′ /∈ Dt(h′)
and o1 ∈ Ot(h′) \ D<t (h′)) and R1 : o1, o′, by strategyproofness t is matched with o1 (since
o′ /∈ Dt(h′) and t is a dictator at h′, however o1 ∈ Dt(h′)) while 1 is matched with o′ (since
o1 is matched to t, however o
′ ∈ D1(h))— a contradiction to Pareto optimality.
Lemma E.19. Let h be a history of M s.t. two distinct players i, j are active nonlurkers at
h, and k = P (h) /∈ {i, j} has D<k (h) = ∅. Then, either i or j is a dictator at h.
Proof of Lemma E.19. Assume that all agents at h are either active or have not yet moved at
h. (If not, then remove from M all players that have moved before h but are no longer active
at h, along with their houses, keeping all else equal, to obtain a new incentive compatible
gradual revelation mechanism for the smaller set of agents and houses.)
Assume for contradiction that neither i nor j is a dictator at h. Therefore, by Lem-
mas E.8(2), E.13 and E.14, Di(h) ( G(h) ⊆ Oi(h) and Dj(h) ( G(h) ⊆ Oj(h). Further-
more, by Lemma E.18 at most one of the two agents can be matched with any lurked houses,
so we have either G(h) = Oi(h) have or G(h) = Oj(h) (or both). By Lemma E.4, and since
the choice of k at h is nontrivial, there exists o ∈ Y ∗h = Dk(h). We reason by cases.
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Case 1: Di(h) ∪ Dj(h) = G(h). Assume w.l.o.g. that Oi(h) = G(h). We will obtain
a contradiction by showing that j can force any o1 ∈ G(h) \ Dj(h) at h (and therefore,
by Lemma E.13, is a dictator). Let Rj : o1. Since o1 ∈ G(h) \ Dj(h) ⊆ Oj(h) \ Dj(h),
we have by Lemma E.4 that Rj ∈ Rj(h). Fix R−j ∈ R−j(h); it is enough to show that
M(T(R))(j) = o1.
Since o1 ∈ G(h) \Dj(h), we have that o1 ∈ Di(h). By Lemma E.4, Ri ranks o2 highest
among Oi(h) = G(h) for some o2 ∈ G(h) \ Di(h). Therefore, o2 ∈ Dj(h). Let R′i : o2, o1
and R′j : o1, o2. Note that since o2 ∈ Oi(h) \ Di(h), and since o1 ∈ Oj(h) \ Dj(h), we have
that R′i ∈ Ri(h) and R′j ∈ Rj(h). By strategyproofness, i and j must respectively R′i-
and R′j-prefer M(T(R
′
{i,j}, R−{i,j}))(i) and M(T(R
′
{i,j}, R−{i,j}))(j) to o1 and o2. By Pareto
optimality, therefore M(T(R′{i,j}, R−{i,j}))(i) = o2 and M(T(R
′
{i,j}, R−{i,j}))(j) = o1. By
strategyproofness, M(T(R′j, R−j))(i) = o2 as well. Since j must R
′
j-prefer M(T(R
′
j, R−j))(j)
to o2, we have that M(T(R
′
j, R−j))(j) = o1. By strategyproofness, therefore M(T(R))(j) =
o1, as required. So, j can force o1 at h — a contradiction.
Assume henceforth, therefore, that Di(h) ∪ Dj(h) ( G(h). By Lemma E.11, we have
that Ok(h) ⊇ G(h). Assume for now that o ∈ G(h).
Case 2: There exist o1 ∈ Di(h)\Dj(h), o2 ∈ Dj(h)\Di(h), and o ∈ Y ∗h ⊆ G(h)\ (Di(h)∪
Dj(h)). Since M is obviously strategyproof, by the pruning argument of Li (2015), it is
obviously strategyproof on any restricted domain. We restrict the domain of preferences
as follows: Each agent i, j, k ranks {o1, o2, o} above all other houses. The three agents
i, j, k have a common (known) ranking of all other houses. Each other agent ` has a fixed
preference R` ∈ R`(h) that ranks o1, o2, o at the bottom (note that each R`(h) contains such
a preference since no such agent ` lurks o1, o2, or o).
Obtain a new mechanism by pruning all choices that are never taken. Since the prefer-
ences of all agents other than i, j, and k are known in the restricted domain, none of these
agents has any choice to make. After condensing all nodes that proved no choice, we obtain
a new (not necessarily gradual revelation) obviously strategyproof and Pareto optimal mech-
anism Mˆ in which only i, j, and k move. The history hˆ in the new tree that corresponds
to h in the original tree is such that Di(hˆ) = {o1}, Dj(hˆ) = {o2}, and Dk(hˆ) = {o}, and
Oi(hˆ) = Oj(hˆ) = Ok(hˆ) = {o1, o2, o}.
Fix R ∈ R(hˆ) with Ri : o2, o1, Rj : o1, o2. Since Di(hˆ) = {o1}, Dj(hˆ) = {o2}, and
since Mˆ is strategyproof and Pareto optimal, Mˆ(T(R))(i) = o1 and Mˆ(T(R))(j) = o2. This
implies in particular that k cannot force o1 at hˆ. Fix R
′ ∈ R(hˆ) with R′i : o, o2, o1 and
R′j : o, o2, o1 and R
′
k : o1. We have M(T(R
′))(k) = o1 since Mˆ is Pareto optimal. Since k
cannot force o1 ∈ Ok(hˆ), but may prefer o1 most, we have that k is not a dictator at hˆ and
has by Lemma E.4 a unique action a˜ ∈ A(hˆ) that does not determine his match (i.e., the
action a˜ ∈ A(h) was not removed during the pruning process).
Assume that i = P (hˆ, a˜) (the analysis for the cases P (hˆ, a˜) ∈ {j, k} is analogous).
By Lemma E.4, Ri(hˆ, a˜) = {Ri | maxRi{o1, o2, o} 6= o1}. Again by Lemma E.4, since
D<i (hˆ, a˜) = Di(hˆ, a˜) = o1 we have that agent i must have an action a at (hˆ, a˜) that forces
some o′ ∈ {o2, o}. Let Ri ∈ Ri(hˆ, a˜, a). For Rj : o, o2, o1 ∈ Rj(hˆ, a˜, a) and Rk : o2, o, o1 ∈
Rk(hˆ, a˜, a), we nonetheless have by strategyproofness that M(T(R))({k, j}) = {o2, o} , so i
playing a does not force o′ — a contradiction.
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Case 3: There exists o∗ ∈ Di(h) ∩ Dj(h), and o ∈ G(h) \ (Di(h) ∪ Dj(h)). Consider
a profile R with Ri : o, o
∗ and Rj : o, o∗. We note that any such profile reaches h. By
strategyproofness, M(T(R))({i, j}) = {o, o∗}, so k cannot force o at h — a contradiction.
Assume henceforth, therefore, that o ∈ Di(h) ∪Dj(h).
Case 4: o ∈ Di(h)∩Dj(h). Recall that there exists o′ ∈ G(h)\ (Di(h)∪Dj(h)). Consider
a profile R with Ri : o
′, o and Rj : o′, o. We note that any such profile reaches h. By
strategyproofness, M(T(R))({i, j}) = {o′, o}, so k cannot force o at h — a contradiction.
Case 5: o ∈ Di(h)\Dj(h) and there exists o2 ∈ Dj(h)\Di(h). (The case o ∈ Dj(h)\Di(h)
and there exists o1 ∈ Di(h) \Dj(h) is analyzed analogously.)
Consider a profile R with Ri : o2, o and Rj : o, o2. We note any such profile reaches h. By
strategyproofness, M(T(R))({i, j}) = {o2, o}, so k cannot force o at h — a contradiction.
Case 6: o ∈ Di(h) \ Dj(h) and, Di(h) ⊇ Dj(h) ∪ Y ∗h , and there exists o2 ∈ Dj(h) \ Y ∗h .
(The case o ∈ Dj(h)\Di(h), Dj(h) ⊇ Di(h)∪Y ∗h and there exists o1 ∈ Di(h)\Y ∗h is analyzed
analogously.) We will show that i can force any o′ ∈ G(h) \ Di(h) via some behavior from
h, therefore, by Lemma E.13, obtaining a contradiction to the assumption that i is not
a dictator at h. Assume therefore, for contradiction, that there exists a behavior profile
R−i ∈ R−i(h) s.t. for no Ri ∈ Ri(h) does i get o′. Against this R−i, let i play the following
behavior: always pass (i.e., a˜) unless i can force o′ via an action a with Y (a) = {o′}, in
which case play a; if i becomes a dictator without the option to force o′, then force an
arbitrary house. By gradual revelation, this behavior corresponds to some preference Ri. By
assumption, at some history along Path(T(R)), it would no longer hold that o′ ∈ Oi. Let h′
be the maximal history along this path with o′ ∈ Oi(h′).
We first claim that at no history h ⊆ h′′ ⊆ h′ is it possible that any agent other than i has
a possible action that forces a house o′′ /∈ Di(h′′). Indeed, otherwise let h′′ be such a minimal
history and w.l.o.g. P (h′′) 6= k. By Lemma E.12, we can assume w.l.o.g. that o′′ ∈ G(h′′). We
obtain a contradiction as in Case 5: since the behavior so far of each of i and k is consistent
with the preference that ranks o′′ first (since o′′ ∈ G(h′′)\Di(h′′) and by minimality of h′′ also
o′′ ∈ G(h′′)\Dk(h′′) since Dk(h′′) ⊆ Di(h′′)) and ranks o ∈ Di(h)∩Dk(h) ⊆ Di(h′′)∩Dk(h′′)
second, then by strategyproofness they will together get o′′ and o if these really are their
preferences, and so j cannot force o′′ at h′′.
Furthermore, at no history h ⊆ h′′ ⊆ h′ does any agent actively force (according to T(R))
a house o′′ ∈ Di(h′′), as otherwise by strategyproofness i would get o′ since his preference up
until h′′ is consistent with the preference R′i : o
′, o′′.
Combining the claims from the two preceding paragraphs, we get that every action played
by any agent in any history h ⊆ h′′ ⊆ h′ is pass (i.e., a˜). In particular, (h′, a˜) ∈ Path(T(R)).
Since by definition of h′, we have o′ /∈ Oi(h′, a˜), we have that i 6= t, for t as defined in
Lemma E.18 w.r.t. the history h′.
We now claim that no agent, other than possibly i, lurks o′ at h′. Assume that some
agent l 6= i lurks o′ at h′. Since up until h′, no house is offered to any agent before it is
offered to i, and since i is not a dictator at h′ (since o′ is possible for i at h′ but i cannot
force it), we have that i is also a lurker for o′ at h′ (since as i 6= t, by Lemma E.18 if i is
a nonlurker at h′ then Oi(h′) = G(h′) ⊆ Ol(h′)) — a contradiction to the distinctness of
lurked houses.
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Recall that o′ ∈ Oi(h′) but o′ /∈ Oi(h′, a˜). Since we have shown that no agent can force
o′ at h′ and no agent other than possibly i lurks o′ at h′, we have that o′ ∈ O(h′, a˜). By
Lemma E.11 and since o′ /∈ Oi(h′, a˜)∪Di(h′, a˜), we have that o′ /∈ G(h′, a˜), and so some agent
l 6= i is a lurker for o′ at (h′, a˜). Once again, this means that i is already (since i 6= P (h′))
a lurker for o′ at h′ — a contradiction. (By Lemma E.18, it is possible that the agent t 6= l
gets o′, so we have a contradiction to strategyproofness since i and l are then promised their
respective “second best” options, which may coincide when t gets o′.)
Finally, we consider the case in which o /∈ G(h). Recall that D<k (h) = ∅. By definition,
there is a lurker ` 6= k for o at h, and so by Lemma E.12, k can force any house o1 ∈ G(h) =
Oi(h) from h, and so by the analysis of either Case 4 or Case 5 we are done.
Lemma E.19 shows that at most two active agents at any h are lurkers. The next Lemma
describes the relationship between the sets of houses that these two agents can be endowed
with at any given history h.
Lemma E.20. Let h be a history of M with lurked houses and let t be as in Lemma E.18.
If k = P (h) 6= t is a nonlurker and t is not a dictator at h, then Y ∗h ∩Dt(h) = ∅.
Proof of Lemma E.20. Let o′ ∈ Dt(h). We will show that o′ /∈ Y ∗h . Recall that the oldest
lurker at h, agent 1, lurks house o1. Since t is not a dictator at h, we have by Lemma E.14
that o1 /∈ Dt(h), and so o1 6= o′. Since 1 is the oldest lurker at h, we have that o′ ∈
O(h) \ {o1} = D1(h). By Lemmas E.18 and E.8(2), o1 ∈ Ot(h). Let R1 : o1, o′ and
Rt : o1, o
′. Since o′ ∈ Dt(h)∩D1(h) while o1 ∈ (O1(h) \D1(h))∩ (Ot(h) \Dt(h)), we have by
strategyproofness that when playing R1 and Rt (which reach h) from h, 1 and t get o1 and
o′, and so k cannot force o′ at h and so o′ /∈ Y ∗h , as required.
The characterization is a direct consequence of the above lemmas: since if an agent i
is a dictator at some history h, then we can have him “divulge” his entire preferences at
that point, and thus he becomes inactive, and therefore there always exists a mechanism
implementing the same social choice function where no “already-active” dictators are still
active while others make nondictatorial moves (or become active).
As long as two active agents i, j are nonlurkers, then no one else can join the game and i
and j slowly accumulate houses into Di and Dj, respectively. If one of them, say i, becomes a
lurker, then her lurked house becomes impossible for all agents except one, which we denote
by t (for terminator), and from that point no agent can accumulate houses that are in Dt.
Since i became a lurker, another player k can join the game, and if one of k and j becomes
a lurker, then another can join the game, etc. At some point, the terminator t will be a
dictator, and after her choice, all lurkers by strategyproofness will become matched via a
dictatorship from the “oldest” lurker i (who has the largest list of possible houses) to the
“youngest” lurker (who has the smallest list of possible houses), and no lurkers remain. If
no one forced a house from the option list D` of the nonlurker that did not claim a house,
then he continues (along with D`) to the next round.
E.1 Matching with Outside Options
When agents may prefer being unmatched over being matched to certain houses (and possibly
also more agents exist than houses), the OSP-implementable and Pareto optimal social choice
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functions are similar in spirit, but considerably more detailed to describe, due to the following
phenomenon: Recall that at any point when an agent becomes a lurker, the sets of possible
houses Oi of some other agents i are reduced. In this case, such agents i may be asked by
the mechanism whether they prefer being unmatched over being matched with any house
in (the reduced) Oi (note that for this reason, the set Oi has to be tracked and updated
for all agents and not only for active agent i ∈ T ). If such an agent indeed prefers being
unmatched, then she can divulge her full preferences, and based on these preferences, the
mechanism may now reduce Oi for some other agent, etc. (thus, in a sense, dynamically
choosing the “terminator” agent t defined in the proof above), or even award some lurkers
their lurked houses. The analysis for this case is similar, yet more cluttered, and we omit it.
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